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Delaware Improves Its Treatment of Freezeout Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.' In
considering challenges to corporate takeover tactics, state courts have long had difficulty
striking a satisfactory balance among the competing interests of a target corporation's
management, controlling stockholders and minority shareholders.' While Congress 3 and
many state governments' have enacted takeover legislation, traditionally the state courts
have been left with the difficult task of deciding issues of fiduciary duty and fairness in
challenges to corporate takeovers.' State courts have had particular difficulty deciding
these issues in cases involving freezeout mergers,' where the acquiring corporation is also
the majority shareholder of the target company.' Because the laws of many states, such as
Delaware, allow mergers to be effected upon the affirmative vote of a majority of the
shareholders of the corporations involved," freezeout mergers often occur as the second
step of a corporate takeover." After purchasing a majority of the outstanding common
' 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
• See generally Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers.. A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV, 624,
626-57 (1981). The particular takeover device bidders use often depends on how receptive the
target's management is to an acquisition attempt. See Fische], Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market
or Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1978).
• 
In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982). The
Williams Act was designed to protect investors by requiring full and fair disclosure of the terms of a
tender offer. H.R. Rio'. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 2811, 2813, S. REP. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
4 Most of the leading commercial stales have enacted takeover legislation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983): MAss. GEN. 1..AWS ANN. Cll. HOC, §§ 1-13 (West Supp. 1983-1984); Mien.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.901 to .917 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to :19 (West Supp.
1983-1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1614 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 710, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). Asa result of the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the future vitality of state takeover legislation is uncertain. In
MITE the Court invalidated the Illinois Act, because it found that the Illinois legislation constituted
an impermissible regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 646. State takeover legislation also has
been attacked successfully on federal preemption grounds. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F.2(1 1256, 1280- 81 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho statute declared preempted by Williams Act and
invalid under commerce clause), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443
U.S. 173, 187 (1979). For an analysis of the MITE decision see Note, The Unsung Death of State
Takeover Statutes: Edgar v. MITE Corp., 24 B.C.L. REv. 1017 (1983).
5 See Folk, Stale Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Responsible Management Conduct, 31 Bus.
LAW. 1031, 1033-34 (1976).
• For a detailed account of the historical development of judicial treatment of freezeout
mergers, see Weiss, supra note 2, at 626-57.
▪ Greene, Corporate Freeze -out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487, 489 (1976).
" Delaware General Corporation Law contains two merger provisions. Section 251 is commonly
referred to as Delaware's long-form merger statute. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983). Section 251
authorizes the consummation of a merger upon the affirmative vote of a simple majority of the
shareholders of the acquiring and acquired corporations. Id. § 251(c). Delaware's short-form merger
statute simplifies the merger process in situations where the acquiring corporation owns 90% or
more of the stock of the target company. See id. § 253. Section 253 allows a merger to be effected by
the passage of a resolution by the board of directors of the acquiring corporation. Id. § 253(a).
Section 253 vests the power to consummate a short-form merger solely with the directors of the
acquiring corporation. See id. A merger effected pursuant to section 253 does not have to be approved
by a vote of the shareholders of the target company. In fact, when a parent company effects a
short-form freezeout merger pursuant to section 253, the parent company is not required to notify
the subsidiary's minority shareholders prior to the consummation of the merger. See id.
o See Greene, supra note 7, at 491-94. Commentators have identified three types of freezeout
mergers: I) two-step mergers 2) parent-subsidiary mergers and 3) going-private mergers. See Brud-
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stock of the target corporation," the acquiring corporation can achieve sole ownership of
the target company by voting its majority interest in the target company in favor of a
merger with itself." As a result of this majority vote, the target corporation's minority
shareholders are, in effect, lOrced to sell their shares to the acquiring corporation."
Freezeout mergers differ in several important respects from arm's-length mergers
between unaffiliated corporations." Unlike negotiated mergers between unaffiliated
corporations, the target company's shareholders are not treated equally.'' In a typical
arm's-length merger acquisition, each shareholder of the target company exchanges his
stock for the same proportionate amount of cash or other securities," In a free/emit
merger, the majority shareholder continues its investment in the target company's busi-
ness, while the minority shareholders must either accept the consideration offered by the
majority or challenge the adequacy of the merger price in litigation or in an appraisal
proceeding- . 1 " In a freezeout merger, therefore, there is a significant danger that the
ney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.]. 1354, 1359 - 76 (1978); Greene,
supra note 7, au 491-96, In both two-step mergers and parent-subsidiary mergers, a freezeout merger
is part of a corporate takeover. See Greene, supra note 7, at 491-94. A parent-subsidiary merger
differs from 3 two-step merger, however, because in a parent-subsidiary merger the acquiring
company first operates the target company as a subsidiary before effecting a freezeout merger to
achieve sole ownership of the target. See id. at 492-93. Going-private mergers differ substantially
from two-step mergers and parent-subsidiary mergers. In a going-private merger, a company's
management, having determined that its shares are undervalued, seeks to eliminate the public
stockholders of the company and return the firm to the status of a closely held co rporation. Brudney ,
& Chirelstein, supra, at 1365. The insiders typically create a holding contpany to which they transfer
their controlling shares, and then propose a merger of the operating company into the holding
company. Id. As a result of the merger, the insiders gain sole ownership of the corporation and the
public shareholders generally receive cash in exchange for their shares. Id. Going-private mergers
involve problems of fairness that are quite different from the problems created by two-step mergers
and parent - subsidiary mergers, See id. at 1365 -70. See generally Borden, Going Private - Old Tort, New
Tort, or No Tort, 49 N.V.U.L. Rev. 987 (1974); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975),
" The acquiring company frequently acquires a controlling interest in a corporation through a
cash tender offer. See Austin, Tender Offer Update: 1983, 18 Siege. & Aco. 57, 57 (1983). Cash tender
offers composed 89% of the total number of tender offers made in 1982. Id.
II See Greene, .supra note 7, at 491. Generally, the acquiring corporation forms a wholly'-owned
subsidiary and merges the target company into this newly created shelf corporation. See Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 1357; Weiss, .supra note 2 at 624.
' 2 See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 1357.
" See id. at 1357-59. Brudney & Chirelstein maintain that while majority rule is an appropriate
means of deciding whether an arm's-length merger should be allowed, majority rule in freezeout
mergers does not merit the same deference. See id. at 1357-58. Arm's length mergers are considered
presumptively fair- because it is thought that the majority vote of the shareholders of each corpora-
tion represents the best interests of all the shareholders involved in the transaction. See id. at 1357.
Brudney & Chirelstein argue that (he majority vote of the shareholders of the target company in an
arm's-length merger should be respected because all the larger company's shareholders share the
common goal of maximizing the returns of their' stock and each shareholder will he affected
identically by the outcome of the vote, See id. Brudney & Chirelstein argue that majority rule is not
the appropriate means of determining whether a freezeout merger should be allowed, See id. at
1358-59. Because a danger exists in freezeout mergers that a self-interested majority stock-holder
has ruled infairly, Brudney & Chirelstein conclude that special safeguards are necessary to ensure
that the minority shareholders' interests are protected. Id.
" See id. at 1357.
IS Id. at 1358.
" Greene, supra note 7, at 490. The dissenter's appraisal remedy is entirely a statutory creation.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983); N.Y. Bus. Coln.. LAW § 623 (McKinney Stipp.
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target company's minority shareholders will be treated unfairly, because the acquiring
company is acting in its own self-interest in effecting the merger in order to gain sole
ownership of t he target corporation)? Fit thermore, the minority shareholders stand in an
inferior position in relation to the majority shareholder because the majority shareholder
controls the bargaining process, the flow of information and the valuation of the minori-
ty's stock.'" The Delaware courts have had particular difficulty deciding issues of fairness
in freezeout. merger challenges because the Delaware merger statutes technically allow the
consummation of freezeout mergers regardless of any unfairness or breach of fiduciary
duty by the majority shareholder.'• Weinberger V. UOP, Inc. is the Delaware Supreme
Court's most recent attempt to establish an appropriate standard of review for freezeout
merger challenges.'"
In Weinberger, a former shareholder of the Universal Oil Products Company ("UOP
- )
brought a class action suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery challenging the elimination
of UOP's minority shareholders through a freezeout merger with The Signal Companies,
1983-1984). Appraisal statutes provide that under certain circumstances, a stockholder of a corpora-
tion may force the corporation to pay cash for the "value" of his shares. See Manning, The Sharehold-
er's Appraisal Remedy.. An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE. L.J. 223, 226 (1962). Manning characterized
statutory appraisal remedies as "hail-out" provisions. Id. Although appraisal statutes vary in scope
and form, virtually all appraisal statutes include mergers as transactions that will trigger the remedy
for sonic or all shareholders. See, e.g., Din.. Cow: ANN. tit. 8, 262(b) (1983); N.Y. Bus.. CORP. 1..Aw §
623(c) (McKinney Supp. 1983 - 1984). The Delaware statute provides in pertinent part:
Any stockholder of a corporation of' this state who has complied with subsection (d) of
this section and has neither voted in favor ofthe merger or consolidation nor consented
thereto in writing pursuant to § 228 of this title shall be entitled to an appraisal by the
Court of Chancery of the fair value of his shares of stock under the circumstances
described in subsections (h) and (c) of this section.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (1983). The right of appraisal is not necessarily absolute, however. For
instance, Delaware law provides that no appraisal rights shall be available:
for the shares of any class or series of stock which, at the record date fixed to determine
the stockholders entitled to receive notice of and to vote at the meeting of stockholders
to act upon the agreement of merger or consolidation were either (i) listed on a national
securities exchange or (ii) held of record by more than 2,000 stockholders; and further
provided that no appraisal rights shall be available for any shares of stock of the
constituent corporation surviving a merger if the merger did not require for its
approval the vote of the stockholder's of the surviving corporation as provided in
subsection (1') of § 251 of this title.
Id. § 262(b)( ).
17 See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra time 9, at 1358.
" See Brud trey, Efficient Markets and Fair Fables in Parent -Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J. CORP. L. 63, 71
(1978). Brushy!y states that once a parent company contemplates a merger with a subsidiary, the
parent corporation is "not unlikely to" control both the use of accounting conventions and flow of
financial information so as to decrease the market price of the subsidiary's stock below its intrinsic
value. Id. Brudney argues that for this reason the market price of the subsidiary's stock should not he
an important factor in evaluating the fairness of a merger price. Id. at 64.
19 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Tanzer v. International General
Indus,, Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 310) A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Stauffer
v. Standard Brands, inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962); Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers
Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (Del. 1959); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293,
93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A,2d 331 Del. 1940.
Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (I)el. Ch. 1981); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenlev Indus., Inc.,
281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Ina Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch.
1968); Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (Del. Ch. 1961).
21 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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Inc. ("Signal" ).2 ' The plaintiffs sought to set aside the merger on the grounds that Signal
had unfairly used its majority stock ownership position in UOP to freeze out the minority
shareholders at an inadequate price." Plaintiffs specifically alleged that Signal had ef-
fected the merger fbr the sole purpose of eliminating the minority shareholders from
UOP, that Signal and UOP had misrepresented material facts concerning the bargaining
process in the proxy material and certain press releases and that UOP's board of directors
had breached their fiduciary duty by not attempting to negotiate a higher merger price"
with Signal." Signal had acquired a 50.5% interest in UOP in 1975 through a cash tender
offer. 24 In 1978, Signal decided to investigate the possibility of acquiring the remainder of
UOP's publicly held stock." As part of the investigation, two Signal directors, who were
also directors of UOP, prepared a feasibility study for Signal's board of directors. 26 The
study concluded that it would be a good investment for Signal to acquire the remaining
49.5% of UOP's shares at any price up to $24 per share."
At a meeting of Signal's executive coin mittee, UOP's chief executive officer, James V.
Crawford, who was also a director of Signal, indicated that a Signal proposal to pay
$ 20-$ 2 I per share for UOP's remaining publicly held stock was "generous" and should be
submitted to UOP's minority shareholders for their consideration." At this meeting,
Signal's executive committee authorized its management to negotiate with UOP for the
cash acquisition of UOP's minority shares." Signal's executive committee requested that a
proposal be submitted to Signal's board of directors in four business clays 3° During those
four days, Crawford spoke with UOP's outside directors by telephone. 3 ' During that
period, Crawford also retained Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. ("Lehman Brothers"),
an investment banking firm," to render a fairness opinion as to the price offered for the
minority's stock. 33 After a summary examination of UOP's relevant financial records, 34
Lehman Brothers concluded that a price of $20-$21 per share "would be a fair price for
the remaining shares of UOP." 35 The directors of both corporations approved the merger
" Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1334
- 35 (Del. Ch. 1981).
22 Id. at 1341.
" Id.
" 457 A.2d at 704. Signal purchased 1,500,000 of UOP's authorized but unissued common
stock at $21 per share. M. This negotiated purchase was contingent on a successful tender offer for
4,300,000 of UOP's publicly held shares, also at a price of $21 per share. Id. Immediately before the
announcement of the tender offer, UOP's common stock had been trading at a fraction under $14
per share. Id. The tender offer was greatly oversubscribed, but Signal limited its purchase to
4,300,000 shares, enough when coupled with its purchase of the unissued shares, to give it a 50.5%
ownership interest in UOP. Id.
25 Id. at 705.
"
" Id.
2e
	An this meeting, UOP's president did not try to negotiate a price higher than $21. Id.
Apparently, UOP's president was not informed about the results of Signal's feasibility study indicat-
ing that Signal was prepared to pay as much as $24 per share for UOP's stock. Id. at 705-06.
29 Id.
3" Id. at 705-06.
" Id. at 706.
" Id. Lehman Brothers had previously performed services for UOr and was familiar with
LiOes business. Id.
33
 Id.
" Lehman Brothers only spent three days preparing the fairness opinion for UOP due to the
time constraints imposed by Signal. Id. at 706-07.
35 Id. at 707.
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proposal," but conditioned the consummation of the acquisition on the approval of a
majority of UOP's minority shareholders." At UOP's next annual meeting, a majority of
UOP's minority shareholders approved the merger with Signal at the price of $21 per
share and the merger was subsequently consummated." Asa result of the merger, UOP
became the wholly-owned subsidiary of Signal. 39
Not all of UOP's minority shareholders were satisfied with the merger terms, how-
ever. On behalf of all of UOP's former shareholders who had not exchanged their shares
for the merger price, William B. Weinberger instituted a class action suit in the Delaware
Court of Chancery asking for an injunction rescinding the merger.'" In the event that the
court. found an injunction to be inappropriate, the plaintiffs requested the court to award
damages in an amount the economic equivalent of rescission:" -Die plaintiffs charged
that Signal had effected the merger for an improper purpose, that both Signal and UOP
were guilty of misrepresentation and that UOP's directors had breached their fiduciary
duty by failing to negotiate a higher merger price.' The plaintiffs also maintained that
Signal had used its majority stock ownership position in UOP to eliminate the minority
shareholders at a grossly inadequate price. 43
After a trial on the merits,' the Chancery Court found in favor of the defendants,
holding that the merger terms were legally fair to the plaintiffs." In so holding, the court
"" Id. The directors of both companies met simultaneously. Id. Signal's men on UOP's hoard of'
directors participated in various aspects of UOP's board meeting, although they abstained from
voting. /d. The minutes of the meeting, however, reveal that each of them stated that if they had
voted, they would have voted in favor of the proposed merger. M.
" Id. The merger proposal also required that the minority shares voting in favor of the
agreement, when coupled with Signal's 50.5% interest, comprise at least two-thirds of all UOP shares
outstanding. Id.
Id. at 708. As of the record date of UOP's annual meeting there were 11,488,302 shares of
UOP common stock outstanding. Id. Signal owned 5,688,302 shares. Id. UOP's minority sharehold-
ers owned 5,688,302 shares. Id. At the meeting 3.208,652 (56%) of the minority shares voted. Id. Of
these 2,953,812 voted in favor of the merger and 254,840 voted against it. Id.
3" Weinberger v.- UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Del. Ch. 1981). UOP was merged into Sigco
Incorporated, a shell corporation created by Signal for the purposes of the merger, Id.
.1 " Id. The Chancery Court dismissed Weinberger's first complaint, ruling that Weinberger had
not alleged sufficient facts demonstrating the unfairness of the challenged merger. Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262, 1266- 68 (Del. Ch. 1979). According to the court, because UOP's minority
shareholders had approved the merger, Weinberger had to allege specific acts such as fraud or
misrepresentation to state a cause of action for unfairness. Id. Weinberger subsequently filed an
amended complaint alleging specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation and misconduct. Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1340-41 (I)el. Ch. 1981).
41 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Del. Ch. 1981). Weinberger argued that a
damage award could be in the form of cash or an equivalent amount of Signal stock. Id.
" Id. at 1'348-56.
Id. at 1356-62. The plaintiffs also alleged that Lehman Brothers had conspired with Signal
and its controlled UOP hoard of directors to deceive UOP's minority shareholders into voting to
approve the merger terms. Id. at 1347. The plaintiffs contended that Lehman Brothers actually
worked in the interests of Signal rather than UOP's minority shareholders in rendering its fairness
opinion. Id. The Chancellor held that the plaintiff's had failed to establish such a conspiracy and
entered a judgment in favor of Lehman Brothers. Id. at 1348. The plaintiffs did not appeal this
aspect of the Chancellor's decision. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 702 (Del. 1983).
41 Subsequent to the completion of the trial, Weinberger also filed a motion seeking to enlarge
the class to include all former shareholders of UOP at the time of the merger other than Signal.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Del. Ch. 1981).
" Id. at 1363. The court reasoned that this result made it unnecessary to consider plaintiff's
motion to enlarge the class. Id.
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rejected the plaintiffs' allegations of improper purpose, misrepresentation, breach of
fiduciary duty and unfair price.'" The plaintiffs argued that the merger should be
enjoined because Signal had effected the merger for the sole purpose of eliminating
UOP's minority shareholders in violation of the business purpose requirement established
in Singer v. Magnavox Co. 47 In Singer, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the use of
corporate power by a majority shareholder "solely to eliminate the minority" is a violation
of its fiduciary duty. 48 The Chancellor ruled that Signal had not breached its duty in this
respect because its desire to make a favorable investment with its cash reserves constituted
a valid business purpose for effecting the merger. 49 The court rejected plaintiff's' allega-
tions of misrepresentation because it found that both Signal's press releases and UOP's
proxy materials were not misleading.'" The court also found that UOP's board of
directors had not breached their fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs because UOP's directors
were not required to negotiate a higher merger price for UOP's stock if they believed
Signal's original offer to he fair. 51 Finally the court examined the plaintiffs' allegations
concerning the fairness of the merger price."
The plaintiffs argued that notwithstanding the Chancellor's findings concerning
their claims of improper purpose, misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty, they
nonetheless were entitled to relief because the merger price of $21 per share was
"inadequate and indefensible" on the facts. 53
 The plaintiffs offered the testimony of a
chartered investment analyst who stated that UOP's stock had a fair value of not less than
$26 per share when valued according to the discounted cash flow valuation methods' and
" Id. at 1348-62. The Chancellor stated at the beginning of his opinion that due to the
numerous contentions made by plaintiff, some matters urged by the plaintiff were not specifically'
addressed in the opinion. Id. at 1335. As to those contentions not addressed, however, the Chancellor
stated that he nonetheless had considered them. Id.
" Id, at 1341. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
1 " Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
19 Weinberger v. UOP, inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1350 (Del. Ch. 1981).
5" lel. at 1352,
" Id. at 1354, 1356.
" Id. at 1356-62.
" Id. at 1356.
Id. According to plaintiff's' expert, the discounted cash flow valuation method values a firm's
stock according to the cash generating capabilities of a company as a going concern. W. The following
are plaintiffs' expert's calculations for 1977:
Sources
Income before extraordinary
In Millions
items $24.3
Depreciation 15.0
Deferred income taxes 2.3
Cash flow from operations $41.6 41.6
Uses
Additions for plant and
equipment $16.3
Long-term debt payment (net) 4.5
Cash requirements $20.8 (20.8)
Net free cash from operations $20.8
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under a comparative analysis of premiums paid in similar acquisitions," Although the
Chancellor received the plaintiffs' evidence, he rejected it indicating that past Delaware
practice precluded the use of the discounted cash flow valuation met hod. 56 Instead, the
Chancellor accepted the evidence offered by the defendants who presented expert
testimony valuing UOP's shares under the "Delaware block" approach, the valuation
approach traditionally approved by Delaware decisions dealing with appraisal proceed-
it igs. 57
 Under the Delaware block approach, the value of a corporation's stock generally is
calculated as a weighted average of the corporation's asset value, market price and
earnings per share. 5m The defendants' expert's calculations considered UOP's market.
value," net asset YAK:" and investment value,'" including UOP's dividend record.'
Present value of net free
7.5%" 8.57.**
cash $277.3 $244.6
Excess liquidity 37.0 37.0
Extraordinary items 7.0 7.0
Total discounted cash
flow $321.3 $288.6
Per share value $28.(19 $25.21
* High side of discount range found in sample of 1977/1978 acquisitions.
** Average Moody's industrial bond yield average: February, 1978.
Id. at 1357-58. Non-cash expenses such as depreciation and deferred expenses are added hack to
the income from operations figure in order to derive the cash flow generated from operations. Id. at
1357. Plaintiffs' expert also made similar calculations for 1978 and under UOP's five year business
plan for the years 1978-1982. Id. at 1358. Under the 1978 analysis, he found the value of the
minority's shares to have been $27.16. Id, Under UOP's Five year business plan, plaintiffs' expert
testified that the value of UOP's minority interest was either $25.94 or $30.59 per share. Id.
" Id. at 1358. Plaintiffs' expert concluded as a result of his comparative analysis of premiums
paid in similar acquisitions that a reasonable premium for UOP's publicly held shares would have
been between 70 and 80 per cent. Id. at 1357. Applying this to UOP's high of 14% on February 28.
1978, the last trading day before the announcement of the merger negotiations, plaintiffs' expert
concluded that under this method of analysis, the Our value of UOP's shares was between $25.65 and
$27.30 per share. Id. The defendants' expert testimony concerning acquisition premiums indicated
an average market premium of 48% and a median premium of 41% for comparable transactions. M.
at 1362.
as Id. at 1359 - 60. The Chancellor also seemed concerned that the conclusions reached under the
discounted cash How method were somewhat speculative because the valuation could be manipulated
by varying the discount rate or varying the estimates necessary to arrive at the net free cash figure
itself. See id. at 1359.
" Id. at 1361. The Delaware block approach originated in the case of In re General Realty &
Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 496, 500, 52 A.2d 6, 14-15 (Del. Ch. 1947).
'" See In re General Realty & Utilities Corp•, 29 Del. Ch, 480, 496-500, 52 A.2d 6, 14-15 (Del. Ch.
1947).
" The defendents' expert testified that the average high-low market price for the Five year
period immediately preceeding the merger was $13.87. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333.
1362 (Del. Ch. 1981).
" The defendants' expert calculated the net asset value of UOP to be $20.69 as of the end of the
first quarter in 1978, but he argued that this ligure should be accorded little weight because Signal
was acquiring UOP for its ongoing business value. Id.
61 According to the defendants' expert, the investment value of UOP broke down to be
approximately $14.31 per share on a going concern basis and $16.39 per share on a book value basis.
Id.
" Id. at 1361.
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Based on the evidence presented by the defendants, the Chancellor found that there was
a reasonable basis for finding the merger price of $21 per share to be a fair price to the
minority shareholders of UOP. 63 The Chancellor concluded that when viewed overall, the
terms of the merger were legally fair to the plaintiffs." Dissatisfied with the Chancellor's
findings, the plaintiffs sought review in the Delaware Supreme Court.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancellor's decision," spe-
cifically eliminating the Singer business purpose requirement from Delaware law." The
court examined the Signal-UOP merger under the entire fairness test first articulated in
1952 in the case of Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp." I n Sterling, the Delaware Supreme
Court. ruled that, because the parent company stood on both sides of the transaction, the
parent company had to establish the "entire fairness" of the merger terms to the sub-
sidiary's minority shareholders. 66 In Weinberger, the court stated that the concept of entire
fairness is composed of two "basic aspects:" fair dealing and fair price." After a review or
the facts of the transaction, the court concluded that the Signal-UOP merger did not.
satisfy "ally reasonable concept of fair dealing."'" Consequently, the court reversed the
Chancellor as to this aspect of his decision." For the purpose of determining fair price
under the entire fairness test, and for the purpose of determining fair value in future
appraisal proceedings, the Weinberger court ruled that. Delaware courts are no longer
restricted to the exclusive use of the Delaware block, weighted average valuation
inethod. 72 The court field that Delaware courts may now employ any modern valuation
technique generally accepted by the financial community in determining the fair value of
a corporation's stock.Ti Although the court found that Signal had not established the
entire fairness of the merger terms, the court refused to set aside the merger, finding it.
"too involved to undo."' The court remanded the case and instructed the Chancellor to
decide what, if any, damages to award to the plaintiffs "based upon entire fairness
standards, i.e. Ur dealing and fair price." 75
The Weinberger decision represents a significant improvement in Delaware's treat-
ment of freezeout merger challenges. First, the decision improves the treatment of
minority shareholders involved in fieezeout mergers. Even though the Singer business
purpose requirement represented a possible ground for an injunctions, the Weinberger
court's elisnination of the business purpose test actually improves judicial treatment of
minority shareholders involved in freezeont mergers. By directing the attention of the
Delaware courts to a review of the twin components of the entire fairness standard, fair
dealing and fair price, the Weinberger court has made certain that in future cases the
"'Id. at 1362.
H I Id. at 1363.
' 5 Weinberger v. UO]', tic., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
"" Id. at 704, 715.
"' ht. at 710-11 (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293. 93 A.2d 107 (Del.
1952)).
"" Sterling v. 3.1ayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298. 93 .A.241 107, 110 (Del. 1952).
• "" .157 A.2d at 711.
T" Id. at 712.
''
72 hi. at 712-14.
72 Id. at 713.
" hi. at 714.
75 hi.
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treatment of the minority shareholders will be the sole subject of judicial review. In
addition to focusing the Delaware courts' scrutiny of future freezeouts on the treatment
of minority shareholders, the Weinberger court also improved the appraisal remedy
available to minority shareholders. Although apparently restricting the financial remedy
available to minority shareholders to appraisal," the Weinberger court improved the
effectiveness of the appraisal remedy by allowing the use of modern valuation techniques
in future appraisal proceedings." The use of such techniques in appraisal proceedings
will serve to guarantee that former shareholders receive fair value for the shares expro-
priated from them.
In addition to improving the treatment of minority shareholders, the Weinberger
decision also improves the state of Delaware merger law from management's point of view
by eliminating tine Singer business purpose requirement. No longer will management have
to face the uncertainty that a merger will be enjoined because a court found the purpose
for the merger to be impermissible. The Weinberger court articulated clear guidelines and
procedures that will facilitate the structuring of parent-subsidiary freezeout mergers in
the future." By following the procedures suggested by the Weinberger court, management
should be able to structure future merger transactions without fear of judicial attack from
dissatisfied minority shareholders. Weinberger, therefore, improves the quality of minority
shareholder treatment in Delaware and clarifies the expected role of management in
structuring parent-subsidiary mergers.
This casenote begins with a discussion of the development of Delaware case law
regarding freezeout mergers in order to establish the context in which Weinberger was
decided." This historical discussion begins with a description of the important Delaware
decisions preceding Singer Magnavox Co." This discussion includes a brief discription
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sanle Fe Industries, Inc. a. Green, which
immediately preceded the Singer decision and may have influenced the Delaware Su-
preme Court's decision in that case." This background section concludes with a discus-
sion of Singer and its companion case Tanzer a. International General Industries, Inc., the two
cases in which the Delaware Supreme Court announced the business purpose require-
ment for freezeout mergers.'42 After the background section. this casenote presents a
description of the Delaware Supreme Court's ()pillion in Weinaergee," This casenote then
analyzes the reasoning and impact of the Weinberger court's decision." 4
The Weinberger decision represents an improvement in Delaware's treatment of
freezeout mergers for two reasons. First. Weinberger's adoption of the entire fairness test
as the sole standard of' review affords minority shareholders more effective protection
against unfair treatment by a majority shareholder than did the Siager business purpose
test. Rather than providing minority shareholders with effective protection, the Singer
business purpose requirement only served to create confusion among the Delaware courts
as to what constituted a valid business purpose for effecting a freezeout merger. Second,
" Id. at 715.
77 Id. at 712-13.
7 " See id. at 709 n.7.
° See infra notes 86-185 and accompanying ;ext.
"" See infra notes 86-152 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 130-52 and accompanying text.
" 2 See infra notes 152-85 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 185-239 and accompanying text.
" 4 See infra notes 240-371 and accompanying text.
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the Weinberger decision improves the law from management's point of view by providing
management with guidelines for structuring future freezeouts. This casenote will analyze
the impact of future use of the procedural guidelines suggested by the Weinberger court. 55
While Weinberger improves the law of freezeout mergers in Delaware, the Delaware
Supreme Court should have gone further in prescribing management procedures. Be-
cause the Delaware Supreme Court indicated in Weinberger that in the future it would
defer to the form of transactions complying with the procedural guidelines it suggested,
this casenote submits that the Weinberger court should have completely outlined the
structural framework these procedures should take by establishing specific negotiating
guidelines.
1. THE HIS'FORY AND DEVF,LOPMENI' OF DELAWARE'S
TREATMENT OF 1 7 REEZEOUT MERGERS PRIOR TO Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
Historically, minority shareholders have been largely unsuccessful in their attempts
to enjoin freezeout mergers entered into. under Delaware law.'" By and large, the
Delaware courts have relegated dissatisfied minority shareholders to an independent
valuation of their shares in an appraisal preceeding as provided for in Delaware's corpora-
tion statutes," Delaware's appraisal statute pros-ides that under certain circumstances, a
stockholder of a corporation involved in a merger can petition for an appraisal of the fair
value of his shares." If the appraiser finds the fair value of the dissenting shareholder's
stock to be higher than the actual merger price, the appraiser will require the corporation
to pay cash for the fair value of the stock.'" Prior to Singer v. Magnavox Co., the Delaware
courts generally refused to enjoin freezeout mergers which complied with the technical
requirements of the Delaware merger statutes.• This policy of judicial taissez-faire to-
wards mergers complying with the Delaware merger statutes began in 1940, in the case of
Federal United Corp. v. Havender."'
Havender involved a shareholder challenge to the proposed stock for stock merger of
the Federal United Corporation ("Federal") with the Bond and Share Company, Federal's
wholly-owned subsidiary. 92
 The proposed merger would have recapitalized Federal arid
eliminated the accumulated dividends that had accrued on its preferred stock.° 3 Federal's
preferred shareholders filed suit in the Court of Chancery seeking an injunction against
the payment of dividends on the newly issued stock until all the arrearages on the old
stock had been paid.• The Chancery Court granted the injunction," finding that al-
" See infra notes 372-91 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Tanner v. International General Indus., inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Stauffer v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962); Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers
Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 89'3 (Del. 1959); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch.
318, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch.
1971); Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (Del Ch. 1961).
" 7 See cases cited supra note 86. For a detailed description of the historical development of the
law relevant to freezeout mergers prior to the Singer decision see Weiss, .utpra note 2, at 644-57.
ea
	 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983).
" See id.
" See Weiss, supra note 2, at 644- 57.
"' 24 Del. Ch. 318, 334, 11 A.2d. 331, 338 - 39 (Del. 1940).
92 Id. at 322, I I A.2d at 333.
"' Id.
Havender v. Federal United Corp., 23 Del. Ch. 104, 113, 2 A.2d 143, 147 (Del. Ch. 1938).
" Havender v. Federal United Corp., 24 Del. Ch. 96, 109, 6 A.2d 618, 624 (Del. Ch. 1939). The
case was heard twice in the Chancery Court. See Havender v. Federal United Corp.. 24 Del. Ch. 96, 6
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though the transaction was structured as a merger, in substance the transaction was an
impermissible recapitalization." On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the
Chancery Court. 97 According to the Hovender court, a single shareholder should not he
allowed to block a merger that had met Delaware's statutory requirements, provided that
the merger terms were both fair and equitable." The court stated that the power to
merge was "plain, understandable and general," and "not qualified by limitation or
exception.'" The court also explained that under Delaware law, minority shareholders
take their stock with notice that the corporation in which they own stock may merge with
another corporation upon an affirmative vote of the requisite number of stockholders as
provided tOr by Delaware's merger statutes.'" The court concluded that if a shareholder
is dissatisfied with the terms of a merger, the stockholder' should demand and receive the
fair value of his shares as provided for by Delaware's appraisal statute)"
In 1952, in the case of Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.," 2 the Delaware Supreme
Court for the first time allowed minority shareholders to attack a merger on fairness
grounds even though on its face, the merger complied with the relevant Delaware stat-
utes.'" In Sterling, the minority shareholders of the Mayflower Hotel Corporation
("Mayflower") filed suit in the Chancery Court seeking a preliminary injunction to
prevent the proposed stock fOr stock merger of Mayflower and Mayflower's parent
company, the Hilton Hotels Corporation ("Hilton"), '" The plaintiffs alleged that the
terms of the merger were fraudulent arid unfair to Mayflower's minority shareholders.'"
The Chancery Court found no evidence of fraud and concluded that the terms of the
merger were "legally fair- to Mayflower's minority shareholders.'" Accordingly, the
court refused to issue a preliminary injunction."' On appeal, the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed the Chancery Court's decision)" Unlike its previous decision in Havender,
however, t he Sterling court did not relegate Mayflower's minority shareholders exclusively
A.241 618 (Del. Ch. 1939); Havender v. Federal United Corp., 23 Del. Ch. 104, 2 A.2d H3 (Del, Ch.
1938). Tire first time the case was heard, although the Chancellor found generally in favor of the
plaintitTh, he staled that he wished to consider further the effects of issuing art injunction before
entering a final decree. Havender v. Federal United Corp., 23 Del. Ch. 104, 113-14, 2 A.2d 143, 147
(Del. Ch. 1938). The Chancellor died before he entered a final decree and the case was heard a
second rime on a motion for reargument by the defendant. /lavender v. Federal United Corp., 24
Del. Ch. 9ti, 99, 6 A.2d 618, 624 (Del. Ch. 1939).
"" [lavender v. Federal United Corp., 24 Del. Ch. 96, 104, (1 A.2d 618, 622 (Del. Ch. 1939). The
Delaware Supreme Court had previously held that accumulated dividends could not he extinguished
by amending the corporate charter. Keller v. Wilson it.: Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 412-13, 190 A.2d 115,
125 (Del. 1936).
" 7 Federal United Corp. v. Havender. 24 Del. Ch. 318, 348, 11 A.2d 331. 344 (Del. 1940).
9" Id. at 334, 11 A.2d at 338-39.
99 /4. at 330-31, 11 A.2d at 337.
1 "" M. at 333, 11 A.2d at 338.
""' Id. at 334-35, 11 A.2d at 339.
'" 2 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952).
"" Id. at 297-98, 93 A.2r1 at 109-10.
1 " 1 Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 20, 22-23, 89 A.2d 862, 864 (Del. ch. 1952).
The merger agreement provided that each share of Mayflower stock. would be converted into one
share of Hilton stock. Id. at 23, 89 A.2d al 864. At I lie time of the proposed merger, Hilton owned
approximately five-sixths of Mayflower's outstanding stock. Id.
'"s Id, at 22, 89 A.2d at 864.
1 "" Id. at 35, 89 A.2d at 871.
1117 j1d.
1 " Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del, Ch. 293. 315, 93 A.2d 107, 119 (Del. 1952).
696
	
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:685
to the statutory appraisal remedy.'" Instead, the Sterling court allowed the minority
shareholders to challenge the proposed merger, ruling the Hilton had the burden of
establishing the "entire fairness" of the transaction because Hilton's directors stood on
both sides of the transaction."" The court reasoned that this was the appropriate alloca-
tion of the burden of proof because Hilton, as the majority shareholder of Mayflower,
stood in a fiduciary position in respect to its dealings with Mayflower's minority share-
holders.'" Although the Sterling court allowed the minority shareholders to challenge the
merger, the court refused to enjoin the merger because it found that Hilton had estab-
lished that the terms of the merger were in fact fair to the minority shareholders."'
Although the entire fairness requirement announced in Sterling seemed to afford
minority shareholders with a means for seeking equitable relief in freezeout merger
challenges, subsequent decisions by the Delaware courts did not utilize the Sterling stan-
dard as a basis for enjoining unfair mergers. For example, in Stanger v. Standard Brands,
Inc.,"" the Delaware Supreme Court did not require the parent company to satisfy the
Sterling entire fairness requirement."' The Stanger case involved the merger of the
Planters Nut and Chocolate Company ("Planters") and Standard Brands, Inc. ("Stan-
dard")."' Because Standard owned more than 90% of Planters' outstanding stock,"fi
Staticlard's board of directors effected the merger with Planters by adopting an appropri-
ate resolution, as provided for by Delaware's short-form merger statute.'" The minority
shareholder's of Planters brought a class action suit in the Court of Chancery"" seeking to
set aside the merger on the grounds that the merger price was so inadequate that it
constituted a constructive fraud on Planters' minority shareholders." 9
 The plaintiffs also
alleged that Standard, as the majority shareholder of Planters, breached its fiduciary
obligation to the minority by failing to offer a fair price for their shares. 12" The Chancery
Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff's'"only remedy
lies in their right to an appraisal."'"
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's ruling. 122
Because the court found that the "very purpose of the statute [section 253j is to provide
the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in
1 " 9 See id. at 298, 93 A.2d at 110.
1 " Id. The defendants apparently conceded that the minority shareholders could attack the
merger and did not argue that appraisal should be their exclusive remedy. Id.
i" Id. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-110. In support of this proposition, the court cited Keenan v.
Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (Del. 1938) and Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch.
82, 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952). Sterling, 33 Del. Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-10. The Gottlieb case
concerned self-dealing on the part of directors involved in a stock option plan. Gottlieb, 3 Del. Ch. at
83-84, 90 A.2d at 661. The Delaware Supreme Court stated that "the burden is upon the directors to
prove not only that the transaction was in good faith, but also that its intrinsic fairness will withstand
the most searching and objective analysis." Id. at 88, 90 A.2d at 663.
72 Sterling, 33 Del. Ch. at 311, 93 A.2d at 117.
n" 41 Del, Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962).
See id. at 11, 187 A.2d at 80.
115 Id. at 8, 187 A.2d at 79.
"" Id. at 9, 187 A.2d at 79.
" 7 Id. at 9-10, 187 A.2d at 79. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1983).
"" Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 202, 203, 178 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1962).
"9 Id. at '205, 178 A.2d at 312,
12u id,
12 ' Id. at 212, 178 A.2d at 316.
' 22 Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 11, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962).
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the enterprise," the court held that equitable relief would not be appropriate in the
instant case.'' _In fact, the court stated that it would be "difficult to imagine a case
under the short merger statute in which there could be such actual fraud as would entitle
a minority to set aside the merger." 12 ' The court found that the directors of Planters had
not breached any fiduciary obligations owed to the minority shareholders by not attempt-
ing to negotiate a higher merger price, because section 253 explicitly authorized unilat-
eral action by Standard's directors by virtue of its 90% ownership interest in Planters." 5
The court concluded that because the instant case only involved a dispute over the value
of the plaintiffs' stock in Planters, the minority shareholders' only remedy was to seek
appraisal.'" Because the Delaware courts had continually ruled that absent a showing of
actual fraud or gross overreaching equitable relief was inappropriate in freezeout merger
challenges,'" disgruntled minority shareholders began to look to the federal courts for
relief.'" Although plaintiffs initially met with some success under the federal securities
laws under Rule 106-5,'" the Supreme Court in Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Greenta" placed
severe restrictions on obtaining such relief in the future in federal court."'
The Sante Fe case involved the merger of the Kirby Lumber Corporation ("Kirby")
and Sante Fe Industries ("Sante Fe" ).' a2 Sante Fe owned more than 95% of Kirby's stock
at the time of the merger.' 33 Pursuant to Delaware's short-form merger statute, Sante Fe's
board of directors adopted a resolution approving the merger of the Iwo companies and
the merger was subsequently consummated.' 34 Dissatisfied with the merger terms, the
former minority shareholders of Kirby brought a class action suit in federal district
court.' 35 The plaintiffs alleged that the merger itself, its statutory means of consum-
mation and the merger price constituted a "device, scheme or artifice to defraud" in
'" Id. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80.
12 ' Id. at 10, 187 A.2d at 80. The court ruled that because the minority shareholders' only claim
involved the adequacy of the merger price, it was not necessary to hold that under no circumstances
could a minority shareholder obtain equitable relief for fraud. Id. at 11, 187 A.2d at 80.
123 Id. at II, 187 A.2d 80.
125 Id.
' 27 See, e.g., Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 522, 154 A.2d 893, 898
(Del. 1959) (merger agreement providing for a cash payment to the minority shareholders was
authorized by section 253): 'David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 36 (Del. Ch.
1971) (court of equity should not impede the orderly consummation of a merger absent a showing of
fraud or overreaching); Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 82, 174 A.2d 29, 30 (Del. Ch. 1961)
(absent fraud or a showing that the merger terms were so unfair as to shock the conscience of the
court minority shareholders would not be allowed to block the merger). In the case of David J.
Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Ina Inc., 249 A.2d 427. 436 (Del. ch. 1968), however, the Chancery Court
did issue a preliminary injunction restraining the consummation of a merger on the grounds that the
parent company could not adequately prove the entire fairness of the merger terms. Id.
"" See, e.g., Green v. Sante Fe Indus., Inc., 553 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 553 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), uacated, 429 U.S. 881 (1977).
125 See id. Rule 106-5 is found at 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(c) (1983).
130 430 U1S. 462 (1977).
131 Id. at 465.
132 Id.
i33 Id.
13 ' Id. at 465-66. Pursuant to the merger agreement, Kirby's minority shareholders were paid
$150 per share, $50 above the prevailing market price. Id. at 466. Kirby's assets, however, were
estimated to be worth more than $600 per share. Id.
135
	
v. Sante Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 850-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 553 F.2d
1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
698	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 25:685
violation of Rule 10b-5." 6 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the means for effecting
the Sante Fe-Kirby merger operated as a fraud on Kirby's minority shareholders because
the merger was consummated for the benefit of Sante Fe without any legitimate business
purpose except to eliminate Kirby's minority shareholders." 7 The plaintiffs also alleged
that the low value placed on their shares by Sante Fe was in itself fraud actionable under
Rule 1Ob-5. 1 " The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss,' 39 stating that
the reach of Rule 101)-5 did not prevent Delaware from providing majority shareholders
with a means of eliminating a minority from the future affairs of a corporation."" Absent
a showing of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure, the district court ruled that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of' action under Rule 1011-5." 1 On appeal, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling. 12
 The Circuit Court held
that the plaintiff's had stated a cause of act ion under Rule 1 Ob-5, because, according to the
court, Rule 101)-5 encompasses "breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority
shareholders without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure."" 3 On writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. 144
The Supreme Court held that a transaction had to involve some element of deception
or manipulation in order to constitute a violation of Rule 1013-5." 5
 The Court found no
deception in the matter befbre it because Sante Fe had made disclosure to the minority
shareholders after the consummation of the merger as provided for in Delaware's short-
form merger slat ute." 6
 In addition, the Court found that Sante Fe had not employed any
manipulative devices in effecting the merger."' The Court concluded, therefore, that
plaintiffs' only remedy was to petition for an appraisal of their shares, as provided by
Delaware law."' The Court reasoned that it would he inappropriate for the federal courts
to interpret Rule 10b-5 as outlawing transactions that complied with state law and had
been consummated without deception.'" Significantly, however, the Court stated that,
' 36 Id. at 852.
137 Id .
mi
"9 Id. at 856.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 854-55.
"2
 Green v. Sante Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977).
1 " Id.
'" Sante Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462. 480 (1977).
15 Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 474 n.14. Section 262 provides in pertinent part:
If the merger or consolidation was approved pursuant to § 228 or § 253 [short-form
merger provision] of this title, the surviving or resulting corporation, either before the
effective date of the merger or consolidation or within 10 days thereafter, shall notify
each of the stockholders entitled to appraisal rights of the effective date of the merger
or consolidation and that appraisal rights are available for any or all of the shares of the
constituent corporation, and shall include in such notice a copy of this section.
DEL. Cone ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(2) (1983).
1 " 430 U.S. at 476.
l '" Id. at 474.
1 " Id. at 479. The Court stated: "Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are
reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities, particularly where established state policies of' corporate regulation would be overrid-
den." Id.
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although there may be a need for federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers, "those
standards should not he supplied by judicial extension of section 10(b) and Rule I Ob-5 to
'cover the corporate universe.' """ Consequently, while it did not approve of Delaware's
treatment of freezeout mergers, the Court refused to allow the federal courts to deal with
the problems created by freezeout mergers under Rule 10h-5.' 5 ' Sante Fe, therefore,
decisively threw the matter of freezeout mergers back to the states, setting the stage for
the Delaware Supreme Court's landmark decision in Singer v. Magnavox Co. 152
Singer involved a challenge to the cash merger of Magnavox Company ("Magnavox")
and T.M.C. Development Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the North Amer-
ican Philips Corporation.'' Philips had acquired 84% of Magnavox through a cash
tender offer.'" Dissatisfied with the terms of the merger, the minority shareholders
brought a class action suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery alleging that the merger was
fraudulent because its only purpose was to eliminate the minority shareholders of Mag-
navox at a grossly inadequate price.' 55 The Court of Chancery granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss, ruling that the merger was not fraudulent merely because it was
accomplished for the sole purpose of eliminating Magnavox's minority shareholders. 156
The Chancery Court stated that, in any event, the plaintiffs' remedy was to seek an
appraisal of their shares if they were dissatisfied with the merger price.' 57 The plaintiffs
appealed this ruhng to the state Supreme Court. 15 "
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed. 159 The court began its opinion by articulat-
ing the obligations owed by a controlling shareholder in the context of a long-form
merger.'" The court explained that the controlling shareholder in a freezeout merger
owes a high standard of fiduciary fairness to minority shareholders, which is not always
satisfied by full compliance with the Delaware merger statutes."' The court stated that
despite statutory authorization for the merger ancl the defendants' compliance with the
statute's terms, the transaction was not insulated from review by a court of equity.' 62
According to the Singer court, Delaware courts would not be indifferent to mergers
"" Id. at 479-80. In support of this statement, the Court cited Professor Cary's article attacking
Delaware's corporate jurisprudence and urging the adoption of new laws incorporating federal
fiduciary standards. Id, at 480 n.17 (citing Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663, 700 (1974)).
' 5 ' See 430 U.S. at 479-80.
112 380 A.2d 969 (Del, 1977).
183 Id. at 971.
L54 Id.
'" Id. at 972.
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A,2d 1349, 1358 (Del. Ch. 1976).
'" Id. at 1362.
158 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
159 Id. at 980. Singer was decided shortly after the Supreme Court decided Santa Fe. Santa Fe's
suggestion of possible federal corporate legislation, see supra note 149.50 and accompanying text,
may have influenced the Singer court's decision to establish a business purpose test for minority
shareholder protection. The Singer court stated: "Santa Fr is a current confirmation by the Supreme
Court of the responsibility of a state to govern the internal affairs of corporate life." 380 A.2d at 976
n.6.
"" Id. at 972-73.
' 6 j Id. at 975.
152 Id. The court held that the merger was assailable because "'inequitable action does not
become permissible simply because it is legally possible,' "Id. (quoting Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus-
tries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)).
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effected solely for the purpose of eliminating minority shareholders from further equity
participation in a corporation, despite earlier case law holding that minority shareholders
take their stock with constructive notice that Delaware's merger statutes provide for
majority shareholder action in accomplishing mergers.'" The court then articulated a
two pronged test for determining the validity of freezeout mergers.' 64 First, the court
held that in a parent-subsidiary merger, the majority shareholder must prove a valid
business purpose for effecting a merger in order to satisfy Delaware's high fiduciary
standards.' 66
 Second, even if the defendants meet this burden, the court held that the
lower courts must also scrutinize all aspects of a merger for compliance with Sterling's
mandate of entire fairness.' 66
While the business purpose test announced in Singer clearly marked a shift in
Delaware's treatment of freezeout mergers, the court explicitly declined to specify whose
business purpose would be relevant in the examination of a merger challenge.'" More
importantly, the court did not articulate any criteria for evaluating what constituted a
valid business purpose. The Singer court also failed to elaborate on the concept of entire
fairness which was originally developed in Sterling.'" The Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc. 1 " provided partial answers to
some of the issues left unresolved by Singer.'
One month after the Singer decision was handed down, the Delaware Supreme Court
decided the Tanzer case. Tanzer involved a challenge to a proposed long-form merger of
the Kliklok Corporation ("Kliklok") and International General Industries (" G I")." I At
the time of the proposed merger, IGI owned 81% of Kliklok's outstanding common
stock,'" The Tanzers, owners of Kliklok stock, brought suit in the Court of Chancery
seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the merger on the ground that the sole
purpose of the merger was to serve the interests of the majority shareholder." 3 The
Chancery Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plain-
tiffs appealed. 174
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's decision,'
ruling that the Singer business purpose requirement could be satisfied when a merger was
effected solely to advance the business purposes of a parent company. 176
 The court found
"3
 380 A.2d at 979. The Singer court distinguished !lavender, Bruce, Stauffer and Schenley as
factually different from the instant case. h!. at 978 - 79. For a discussion of nal/ender and Stauffer see
supra notes 91-101 and 113-36 and accompanying text. The Singer court stated that none of these
cases involved straight "cash-for-stock" mergers in which the only purpose for the merger was the
elimination of the subsidiary's minority shareholders. 380 A.2d at 987.
i" Id. at 980.
1 " Id.
inc Id.
I"7
	 n.11.
" 5
 For a discussion of the Sterling test, see supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
"9
 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
"0
 Id. at 1124.
1 " Id. at 1122.
172 Id,
'" Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 384 (Del. Ch. 1979) (Chancery
Court on remand describing unreported procedural history of the case).
'' Id. at 395.
"5 Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. 1977).
l" Id. at 1124. The court reasoned that IGI, as a stockholder of Kliklok, had a right to 'look to
its own corporate concerns in determining how to conduct the latter's affairs, including a decision to
cause it to merge." Id. The court cited the Ringling rule that a stockholder may vote in his own
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that 1GI had satisfied the Singer requirement by demonstrating that its merger with
Kliklok facilitated its own long-term debt financilig.'" As in Singer, the Tanzer court stated
that the establishment of a "bona fide" business purpose would not necessarily discharge
the parent company's fiduciary obligations.'" Employing Singer's two pronged test, the
Tanzer court held that even after proving a valid business purpose for effecting the
proposed merger, the parent company had to establish that the merger terms were
entirely fair to the subsidiary's minority shareholders.'" Although the Tanzer court.
affirmed the Chancellor's ruling denying injunctive relief, the court remanded the case
because it found that the plaintiff's were still entitled to a "fairness hearing under
Singer."'"
While Tanzer answered some of the questions left open by Singer, the decision
significantly weakened the potential minority shareholder protection offered by the
Singer business purpose test because it upheld a merger effected solely for the business
purposes of a parent. corporation."' Additionally, the Tanzer decision, like Singer, failed
to provide the lower courts with any definite guidelines for determining what would
constitute a valid business purpose for effecting freezeout mergers in the finure.' 82 The
lower courts were left to decide what constituted a valid business purpose on a case by case
basis, and presumably would allow corporations to justify freezeout mergers by advancing
purposes no more compelling than the purpose approved in Tanzer. 1 ri 3 Consequently,
because the lower courts were deciding merger challenges on a case by case base without
clear guidelines as to what constituted a valid business purpose, the Chancery Court
decisions were often conflicting and somewhat arbitrary."' The doctrinal confusion that
followed Singer and l'anzer culminated in Weinberger v. UOP,
self-interest as supporting this conclusion. Id. (citing Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Corn. Shows, v.
Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 622, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947)).
'" 379 A.2d at 1124. The Tanzer court emphasized that while a merger may he effected solely
for the business purposes of the parent company, the purpose advanced by the parent company had
to be "bona fide" and not a "subterfuge" created to eliminate the minority shareholders. Id.
17" Id. at 1125.
17% jrd.
17444
'"' See id. at 1124-25.
"7 See id. at 1124.
7 X 3 See Brudney & Chirelstein,supra note 9, at 1371. Brudney & Chirelstein believe that it would
be impossible to deny that a commercial goal was wholly lacking in any parent-subsidiary merger. Id.
The possibility of economic gain for the parent company always exists because the combined overall
value of the enterprises may become greater than the value of the firms as separate entities, prior to
the merger. !d. Brudney & Chirelstein maintain that even if these "synergistic gains" are minimal,
management still would have other economic justifications for accomplishing a parent-subsidiary
merger. Id. A parent-subsidiary merger would reduce the difficulty of establishing fair intercompany
dealings in allocating overhead costs, tax benefits and growth opportunities. Id.
"" See Young v, Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372, 1378 (Del. Ch. 1978). The Chancery Court's
decision in Young v. Valhi, Inc., demonstrates the difficulty the lower courts experienced in applying
the Singer business purpose test. Id. In Young, the Chancery Court enjoined a parent-subsidiary
merger because it found that the "basic purpose" or the merger was to eliminate the minority
shareholders of the subsidiary. Id. at 1378. The court rejected the parent company's contentions that
the merger would lead to tax savings for the parent company and avoid possible conflicts of interest,
Id. at 1377. The court stated that the tax savings could be achieved by other means and that the
conflicts were "somewhat contrived." Id. There is little doubt that the merger in Young advanced the
economic interests of the parent company and that a "basic purpose" of the parent company in
Tanzer was to eliminate the minority shareholders of the subsidiary. The distinctions between the
purposes of these two mergers appear to be largely metaphysical.
'" 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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l I. THE Weinberger DECISION
In a unaminous decision, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the business
purpose requirement announced in Singer was "no longer the law of Delaware,'' 5 The
court ruled that the entire fairness prong of the Singer test was the only appropriate
standard of review for shareholder challenges to freezeow mergers.'" According to the
Weinberger court, the concept of entire fairness as first announced in the Sterling case, was
comprised of two "basic aspects:" fair dealing and fair price."" The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed the Chancellor's findings concerning the fair dealing aspects of the case,
stating that the Signal-GOY merger did not satisfy "ally reasonable concept of fair
dealing."'" The Weinberger court also held that the Delaware courts were no longer
restricted exclusively to the use of the Delaware block, weighted average valuation
method in determining fair price)" The court ruled that the Delaware courts were free
to use modern stock valuation techniques for the purpose of determining fair price under
the entire Fairness test and for the purpose of determining fair value in an appraisal
proceeding.'" Although the Weinberger court reversed the Chancery Court regarding its
findings of fair dealing and its strict application of the Delaware block valuation method,
the Delaware Supreme Court refused to set aside the "long completed transaction." 112
Instead, the court remanded the case to the Chancery Court for a determination concern-
ing a possible damage award. 193
The Weinberger court began its review of the Signal-UOP merger by articulating the
appropriate allocation of the burden of proof,'" According to the court, in order to
challenge a merger under the Sterling entire fairness standard, minority shareholders
must allege specific acts of "fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct." 195
Once the plaintiff has invoked the Sterling entire fairness obligation, the court stated that
the parent company must. prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the merger
terms were entirely fair to the minority shareholders. 1 °" The court stated, however, that
the parent company could shift the burden of proof entirely hack to the minority
shareholders if it could demonstrate that the terms of the merger were approved by an
informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders.' 97
 In order to prove that the
minority shareholder vote was "informed," the court stated that the parent company had
to demonstrate that it completely disclosed all the material facts relevant to the transaction
to the minority shareholders.'"
Turning to a consideration of the facts before it, the Weinberger court found that the
vote of UOP's minority shareholders approving the terms of the merger was ineffective,
because it was not informed.'" The court based this finding on the fact that. the results of
'" Id. at 709.
197
 hi. at 711.
no id.
' 89 14. at 712.
190 14.
19 ' 14. at 712-13.
19z
	 at 719.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 703.
199 Id .
196 Id .
197 Id.
' 9 ' Id,
199 Id.
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the feasibility study prepared by two Signal executives who also served on UOP's hoard of
directors, were not disclosed to UOP's minority shareholders.!" This study indicated that
it would be to Signal's advantage to acquire the remainder of U01"s publicly held shares
at any price up to $24 per share."' Because of this inadequate disclosure, the court ruled
that the burden of proof' remained Signal's and that in order to prevail, Signal had to
prove that the terms of the merger were entirely fair to UOP's minority shareholders. 2 ° 2
The court then moved to a discussion of whether the transaction in Weinberger was
"entirely fair" under the standard developed in Sterling."'
According to the Weinberger court, although the concept. of entire fairness is com-
prised of two basic components, fair dealing and fair price, these components should not
be considered in isolation in considering the validity of a corporate merger."' The court
explained that while proof of both fair dealing and fair price would be necessary to satisfy
the entire fairness standard, the concept of entire fairness required that a merger also be
reviewed in light of the total circumstances surrounding the transaction. 2 " The court
then discussed the various aspects of a merger transaction that should he examined under
each component of the entire fairness standard.'" The test for fair dealing, the court
stated, includes considerations of "when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated,
structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors
and the stockholders were obtained." 207 The court, also stated that fair dealing requires
"complete candor" in disclosing information to the shareholders and director's of the
subsidiary 1118
Applying this standard to the facts of Weinberger, the court stated that Signal's
directors sitting on UOP's board violated this duty of complete candor when they failed to
disclose the resifts of the feasibility study. 209 The Weinberger court found that Signal
breached its duty of fair dealing with UOP's minority shareholders in several other
instances as well.''" The court objected to the serious time constraints Signal imposed on
U01"s management when the merger proposal was first presented.'" In addition, the
court found that the negotitions that preceded the merger fell far short of the ideal for
arm's-length bargaining."'' The court observed that UOP's president's only attempt at
negotiating a higher merger price was to convey to Signal the view of UOP's outside
directors that, as to the $20-$21 price range proposed by Signal, the merger price would
211 q Id. at 709.
211 Id. at 705. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
211' 457 A.2d at 703.
£ 11 " Id. at 710.
Id, at 711.
2.05 Id.
300 Id .
207 Id. at 711.
2" Id. at 711. The court stated that the requirement of complete candor is another way of
articulating that Signal's directors serving on UOP's board owed UOP and its shareholders an
"uncompromising duty of loyalty." Id. at 710.
2" Id. at 711-12. The court also found that the minority shareholders were not informed about
the hurried method in which Lehman Brothers prepared the fairness opinion concerning the
merger price. Id, at 712.
7 " Id, at 710-12.
211 Id. at 711. The court was careful to note, however, that the time constraints, standing alone,
would riot necessarily be indicative of a lack of fairness by a majority stockholder. Id. See supra notes
30- 31 and accompanying text.
2 " 457 A.2d at 711.
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have to be $21 per share. 2 ' 3
 These negotiations were characterized by the court as being
"modest at best." 2 " The court also objected to the level of participation by the Signal
directors sitting on UOIrs hoard at the UOP board meeting concerning the merger
propos:11.215 The court found that, although the Signal directors abstained from voting,
they actively participated in other aspects of the meeting.'" Taking all of these factors
into consideration, the court found that the circumstances surrounding the Signal- UOP
merger did not satisfy "any reasonable concept of fair dealing. "217
Signilica tidy, the court articulated two methods by which Signal could have estab-
lished "strong evidence" of fairness in the instant case. First, the court stated that if' Signal
had engaged in arm's-length negotiations with a committee comprised of UOP's outside
directors, the result of the case "could have been entirely different."'" Second, the court
noted that Signal could have achieved the same result if Signal's directors serving on
1_101"s hoard had totally abstained from any participation in the transaction.' In the
absence of an independent negotiating structure or proof of the total abstention of the
subsidiary's interested directors in the matter, the court found that Signal was required to
prove that, it had discharged its fiduciary duty "in light of what. is best for both com-
panies."Y 2 ' The court concluded that on the facts before it, Signal had not met this
obligation."'
Turning to the price component of the entire fairness standard, the Weinberger court
began its analysis by articulating what it meant by "fair price." 222
 The court explained that
fair price relates to the economic and financial considerations of the merger. 223
determining whether a merger price is fair, according to the con rt, "assets, market value,
earnings, future prospects. and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent
value of a company's stock" must be considered."' Moreover, the court held that in
determining the value of a corporation's stock, the Delaware courts were no longer
restricted to the use of the "Delaware block" weighted average valuation approach, but
2 ' 3 Id. The court stated that UOP's president, James V. Crawford, never really "calked price
with Signal." /d.
2" Id. The court noted that UOP had to alter the origins] draft of the proxy statement that was
to be sent to UOI's minority shareholders. Id. at 708. The proxy statement actually sent to
minority shareholders stated that "the price was determined after discussions between James v.
Crawitird, a director of Signal and Chief Executive Officer of UOP, and officers of Signal which took
place during meetings of February 28, 1978 and in the course of several subsequent telephone
conversations. - Id. In the original draft of the proxy statement the wool "negotiations" had been
used rather' than "discussions." Id. When the Securities and Exchange Commission began investigat-
ing the details of these "negotiations," however, the term was deleted and the word "discussions" was
substituted. Id.
2 " Id. at 710.
21" Id. at 707.
217
 Id. at 712.
2 " Id. at 709 n.7.
219 Id. at 710-11.
22" Id. The court stated that Delaware case law had previously established the principle that
directors standing on both sides of a transaction are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith
and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain. Id. at 710. See Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del.
Ch, 1-18, 156, 221 A.2(1 487, 492 (Del. 1966). Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem, Corp., 33 Del, CAI, 177,
178-79, 91 A.2d 57, 57 - 58 (Del. 1952).
221 457 A.2d at 711.
222 Id.
223 Id.at711.
223 a
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instead could also take into account. other generally accepted stock valuation tech-
niques:225 This decision, the court continued, was in keeping with the legislative intent
expressed in a then recent amendment to the Delaware corporat ion law, section 262(h),
which provided dial "all relevant factors" should be taken into account in valuing the
shares of a dissenting shareholder." The court did not examine the fairness of the
merger price under the new standards it had announced, deciding that the issue was to be
decided by the Chancellor on remand."'
After determining that Signal had failed to prove the entire fairness of the transac-
tion, the court turned to a discussion of the appropriate remedy to be applied in the
instant case. The court stated that in most instances the financial remedy available to
minority shareholders in freezeout merger challenges would he appraisal.' In future
appraisal proceedings the court noted that minority shareholders would be able to receive
the fair value of their stock as determined by modern valuation techniques. 229 The court
recognised, however, that such a monetary remedy may not be adequate itt certain cases
involving "fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets or
gross and palpable overreaching. -23" The court stated that in these circumstances, "the
Chancellor's powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable and monetary relief as
may be appropriate, including rescissory damages." 2 '' t Considering the matter before it,
225 Id. The court was careful not to adopt or suggest any particular valuation technique,
preferring to leave the selection of valuation techniques to the parties involved in the dispute. Id.
226 Id. at 713-14. Section 262(h) states, in pertinent part:
After determining the stockholder entitled to an appraisal, she Court shall appraise the
shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any element of value arising from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with a fair rate
of interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value. In
determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors....
DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983). The court pointed out that the first references to "fair
value" appeared in a 1976 amendment to section 262(f). 457 A.2d at 713-14. The court also noted
that in that 198 1 amendment to section 262 the notion of fair value was repeatedly emphasized and
the language instructing the courts to "take into account all relevant factors" appeared in section
262(h). Id. at 714.
227
	 A.2d	 714.
220 Id. at 714-15. The court stated "(t]hus we return to the well established principles ofSfauffer
v. Standard Brand, . . . and David jr, Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc., . . . , mandating a
stockholder's recourse to the basic remedy of an appraisal." Id at 715 (citations omitted).
229 Id. at 712-713.
230 Id. at 714.
"I Id. In Weinberger, the plaintiffs had not sought an appraisal under Section 262. Id. The
plaintiff's had instead sought rescissory damages of the type considered by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 505-06 (Del. 1981). In Lynch, a parent
company had acquired the majority interest in a controlled subsidiary through a misleading tender
offer solicitation. Id. at 499. The price of oil, the principal asset of the subsidiary, rose rapidly during
the period in which fairness of the tender offer solicitation was being litigated. Id. at 501. The
Delaware Supreme Court awarded "rescissory damages," which allowed the former minority share-
holders to reap the benefits of the increase in oil prices which occurred while the case was being
litigated. Id. This result was accomplished by valuing the plaintiffs' stock at the date of the appeal
rather than at the date of the merger. Id.
The Weinberger court seemed io indicate that minority shareholders generally would not be
entitled to realize windfall profits merely because a majority shareholder had breached sonie
fiduciary duty in connection with the merger. See 457 A.2d at 714. The court left open the possibility
that rescissory damages could be awarded in the instant case, however, if the Chancellor, on remand,
considered them susceptible of proof and a "remedy appropriate to all the issues of fairness before
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that even though Signal had not satisfied the entire fairness test, the merger should not be
set aside. 232 The court stated that "this long completed transaction is too involved to
undo.” 233 Remanding the case 10 the lower court, the court directed the Chancellor to
decide the amount of monetary damages to be awarded, if any, based upon entire fairness
standards of fair dealing and fair price.234
Finally, the court addressed the Singer business purpose doctrine. The Weinberger
court concluded that the business purpose doctrine articulated in Singer should be
overruled."' The court explained that given the "expanded" appraisal remedy now
available to dissenting shareholders through the use of modern valuation techniques and
the broad powers of the Chancellor to fashion equitable relief' appropriate to the particu-
lar circumstances, no "additional meaningful protection" would be afforded to minority
shareholders by the application of the Singer business purpose requirement The
Weinberger court observed that in the proceedings below, the Chancellor had "clearly
circumscribed the thrust. and effect of Singer" by ruling that Signal's desire to make an
investment of its cash reserves constituted a valid business purpose for effecting the
merger." The Weinberger court admitted that the Chancellor's decision demonstrated
that the business purpose doctrine could, in effect, be interpreted out of existence. 238
Consequently, with little else in the way of explanation, the Weinberger court eliminated
the Singer business purpose test from Delaware corporation law. 23 "
III. TOE RATIONALE or Weinberger r. UOP,
The Weinberger decision represents a significant improvement in Delaware's treatment of
freezeout merger challenges. in Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court eliminated the
Singer business purpose test from Delaware law"" and established the Sterling entire
fairness test as the sole standard of review for freezeout merger challenges.2.ii This
section of the casenote analyzes the different aspects of the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Weinberger, beginning with an analysis of the Weinberger court's elimination of
the Singer business purpose test.. 212
 Next, this section of the casenote examines the
Weinberger court's decision to establish the Sterling entire fairness test as the sole standard
of review for free/emit merger challenges, 243
 The two components of the concept of
him." Id. Because the Signal-UOP merger was conditioned on appproval by a majority of the
minority shareholders and approval may not have been secured if Signal had made full disclosure,
the Delaware Supreme Court left it to the trial court to decide, on remand, whether the minority
interest in UOP should he valued as of a constructive rescission date rather than the date of the
merger. Id.
2"2
	 A.2(1 at 714.
231 id .
2:14 Id.
23s
	 at 715.
2 " Id.
237 Id.
234 Id, (citing Weiss, The Law of Take Out Merger, A Historical Perspective, 56 NI.Y.U.1- Rev. 624,
671 n.300 (1980).
"" 457 A.2d at 715.
24" Id. at 715.
21
 Id. at 710-11.
2t2
	
infra notes 24699 and accompanying text,
2'3 See infra notes 300-50 and accompanying text.
May 19841	 CASENOTES	 707
entire fairness, fair dealing 2-11 and fair price," ." are examined separately in this section of
the analysis. This casenote submits that the Weinberger decision improves Delaware
merger law by enhancing the quality of minority shareholder protection and by eliminat-
ing the uncertainty which surrounded the Singer business purpose test.
A. The Business Purpose Doctrine
The Weinberger courts decision to override the business purpose requirement repre-
sents a significant improvement in the Delaware judiciary's treatment of freezeout merger
challenges. The business purpose doctrine originated in 1977 in the case of Singer v.
Magnavox Co. 24 " when the Delaware Supreme Court held that the minority shareholders
bringing the merger challenge had stated a cause of action by alleging that the majority
shareholder had breached its fiduciary duty by effecting the merger for the sole purpose
of eliminating the minority shareholders from the corporation. 2 ' 7 By so holding, the
Singer court, in effect, required majority shareholders to demonstrate in future merger
challenges that the merger in question was effected for business reasons other than the
elimination of the minority shareholders from the entity. 2 a" In the subsequent case of
Tanzer v. International General industries, Inc., 2 " the Delaware Supreme Court limited the
scope of the business purpose requirement by holding that the business reasons of a
parent company satisfied the business purpose requirement announced in Singer. 25 '
It is submitted that the business purpose requirement was an inappropriate stan-
dard of review for challenges to freezeout mergers. This section of the casenote first
examines the business purpose doctrine as developed by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Singer and Tanzer."' Next, this section of the casenote analyzes the effectiveness of the
business purpose doctrine in achieving minority shareholder protection in light of the
court's holding in Tanzer. 252 Finally, this section of the casenote demonstrates that the
Weinberger court's decision to eliminate the Singer business purpose requirement clarifies
Delaware merger law and improves the Delaware judiciary's treatment of minority share-
holder interests.'"
In Singer, the Delaware Supreme Court established a two pronged standard of review
comprised of a business purpose requirement. and an entire fairness test.'" The entire
fairness prong of this standard was first established in 1952 in the case of Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Coip.. 255 Subsequent to Sterling, however, the Delaware courts had not
consistently required majority shareholders to establish the entire fairness of' challenged
mergers."'" The two pronged standard of review announced by the Singer court. marked a
244 See infra notes 300.37 and accompanying text.
245 See infra notes 338-50 and accompanying text.
2i6 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
247 Id. at 980.
See id.
"0 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
250 Id. at 1124.
25'
	 infra notes 254.83 and accompanying text.
252 See infra notes 284-93 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
'" 380 A.2d at 980. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
255
	
Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952).
" 6 See, e.g., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962); Coyne v.
Park & Tilford distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (Del. 1959); David J. Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d
29 (Del. Ch. 1961).
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shift from Delaware's previous treatment of free/Atom mergers. Prior to Singer, the
Delaware courts had relied almost exclusively on the statutory appraisal remedy for the
protection of minority shareholder interests.' Before 1977, the Delaware courts had
been reluctant to enjoin mergers that complied with the relevant Delaware merger
statutes. 2 " The Singer court's adoption of a business purpose requirement and its revival
of the Sterling entire fairness test provided minority shareholders with the two possible
grounds on which to seek an injunction to set aside a freezeout merger. 25 " Previously,
Delaware courts had held that, absent a showing of fraud or gross overreaching, minority
shareholders would be restricted to the statutory appraisal remedy. 2" While the entire
fairness prong of the Singer standard of review had roots in prior Del-aware law, the
business purpose requirement announced by the Singer court plainly seemed to he
inconsistent with earlier Delaware merger decisions. Previous Delaware case law had not
inquired into the business purposes behind mergers that complied with Delaware's
merger slat utes. 2"
By establishing the business purpose requirement. the Singer court opened the door
to the possibility that equitable relief would be granted in cases where a parent company
could not advance sullicient business reasons to justify a decision to merge. 262 In support
of its adoption of the business purpose requirement, the Singer court stated that an
investor has a legitimate interest in the form, as well as the value, of his investment. 263
This statement appears to be inconsistent with the court's earlier decisions in Federal
United Corp, v. Havender 2 " arid Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc.' in which the court found
that minority shareholders only had the right to receive the cash value of their shares in
an appraisal proceeding if they were dissatisfied with the merger terms. 2"
The Singer court applied a narrow reading to the holding in Havender, stating that
"Havender stands for the proposition that a merger must be 'fair and equitable in the
circumstances of the case' in order to withstand the veto of a dissenting shareholder." 257
The Singer court's characterization of I-lavender ignored the overran thrust of the opinion
which stressed the absence of limits on the majority shareholder's power to merge. 2" The
Havender court did not suggest the possibility of equitable relief if a merger was not "fair
and equitable," but instead spoke only of the statutory appraisal remedy.269 I n slaver,
the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that absent a showing of fraud or overreaching,
equitable relief would not he appropriate. 2 " In its review of the short-form merger in
"7 See cases cited supra note '256. See supra notes 92-126 and accompanying text.
258 See NUPTa notes 92=126 and accompanying text.
"" 380 A.2d at 980.
2 " See supra note 256.
251 See supra notes 92-126 and accompanying text.
262 380 A.2d at 980.
253 H. at 977-78.
251
 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940).
255 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962).
255 See id. at 11, 187 A.2d at 80; Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. at 334-35, 11
A.2d at 339.
267 380 A.2d at 979. The court also attempted to distinguish Havender on the ground that cash
mergers were not authorized when Havender was decided. Id.
' See 24 Del. Ch. at 330-31, 11 A.2d at 337.
2" Id. at 334-35, 11 A.2d at 339.
27 ' 41 Del. Ch. at 10, 187 A.2d at 80.
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question, the Stauffer court had stated that "the very purpose of the statute [section 253] is
to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's
interest in the enterprise."27 t The Singer court stated that it did not react the Skin/ftr
decision as approving mergers effected for the sole purpose of freezing out the minority
shareholders of a controlled subsidiary. 272 Despite the Singer court's efforts to reconcile
the business purpose requirement with prior case law, the court's decision to allow
minority shareholders to challenge a merger on the ground of improper purpose was
inconsistent with previous Delaware case law which relegated minority shareholders
exclusively to the statutory appraisal remedy.273
In addition to the difficulties the court experienced explaining the inconsistencies
surrounding the business purpose requirement, the Singer court was also unable to
establish a clear conceptual foundation for the business purpose test. The Singer court
attempted to base the business purpose requirement on the fiduciary obligations previ-
ously imposed by Delaware courts on majority shareholders. 274 In support of its conclu-
sion that a "§ 251 merger, made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority sharehold-
ers, is an abuse of the corporate process,"275 the Singer court cited a number of decisions
that invalidated actions taken by controlling shareholders or corporate officers designed
to perpetuate themselves in office. 276 The Court reasoned that if the use of corporate
power to perpetuate control violated the fiduciary duties owed by majority shareholders,
then "[b]y analogy, if not a fortiori, use of corporate power solely to eliminate the minority
is a violation of that duty."277 In using this analogy, however, the Singer court failed to
take into account the significant factual distinctions between freezeout merger cases and
cases involving perpetuation of control by majority shareholders. 27 g
The use of corporate power to perpetuate control is thought to be objectionable
because the forces of efficient market allocation of control are frustrated. 276 One current
theory is that management should not be allowed to block a takeover solely to retain
control, because in many instances, takeovers facilitate the replacement of inefficient
management. 2 " When management eliminates a minority interest in a subsidiary corpo-
ration in a freezeout merger, however, this transaction has nothing to do with a manage-
ment tactic to retain control. Indeed, the very fact that the majority shareholder is able to
"' Id. at 10- Ii, 187 A.2d at 80.
272 380 A.2d at 978-79. The Singer court implicitly acknowledged the conflict between its
holding and the Stauffer decision, stating "[;:]ny statement in Stauffer inconsistent herewith is held
inapplicable to a § 251 merger." Id. at 980.
273 See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. at 11, 187 A.2d at 80; Federal United
Corp. v. !-lavender, 24 Del. Ch. at 334-35, 11 A.2d at 339.
274 See 380 A.2d at 975-78.
276 Id. at 980.
276 Id. at 979 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus,. Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); Condec Corp.
v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum
Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953)).
277
	
A.2d at 980.
276 See id. at 979-80.
279
	 Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics on Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. Ray. 819, 841-42 (1981); Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountability, 34 Bus. LAw.
575, 576-78 (1979).
28" See Gilson, supra note 279, at 841-42. But see Lipton, Takeover Bids in The Target's Boardroom,
35 Bus. LAw. 101, 106-13 (1979).
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effectuate the merger demonstrates that the minority shareholders were not a threat to
the majority's control of the subsidiary. Because the analogy drawn by theSinger court was
not paralle1, 2 " the conceptual basis of the business purpose requirement was suspect in
the context of freezeout mergers. Despite the court's efforts, therefore, the business
purpose requirement and the implicit minority shareholder veto power granted by its
enactment were inconsistent with prior Delaware merger law. 2N2
I n addition to the questionable basis of the business purpose requirement, the Singer
court did not fully explain what business reasons would satisfy the requirement. Because
it was ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court only held that the plaintiffs had stated a
cause of action by alleging that the parent company had effected the merger for the sole
purpose of eliminating the subsidiary's minority shareholders. 2 " The court's decision in
the subsequent case of Tanzer v. International General industries, Inc. created substantial
uncertainty as to what circumstances would merit equitable relief under the business
purpose requirement. In Tanzer, the court allowed the business purpose of a parent
company to suffice as justification for accomplishing a merger. 284 Specifically, the court
held that the parent company had satisfied the business purpose requirement by demon-
strating that the merger with its subsidiary facilitated its own long-term debt financing. 2 H 5
In so ruling, the court significantly decreased the probability that the Singer business
purpose test could be used successfully to enjoin freezeout mergers. After Tallier, there-
!Ore, it scented that a parent company would almost certainly he able to justify a merger
with a subsidiary by showing it received sonic financial benefit as a result of the transac-
tion. 2 " For example, the business purpose approved in Tanzer, that the merger was
accomplished to facilitate the parent company's long-term debt financing, certainly
scented to be less than compelling."' Even though theSinger court apparently devised the
business purpose test in order to protect minority shareholder interests in the context of
freezeout mergers, 2 " the business purpose requirement, as weakened by the court's
holding in Tanzer, did not afford minority shareholders any real protection front unfair
treatment by majority shareholders. Although, in theory, the business purpose require-
ment represented a possible ground on which minority shareholders could win injunc-
tions, plaintiffs were largely unsuccessful in enjoining mergers on improper purpose
grounds. 2 "
While the overran effect of the Tanzer decision significantly decreased the probability
that the business purpose requirement would be used successfully as a grounds for
equitable relief, parent companies planning mergers with subsidiaries still had to be
" I SIT S Pr (I notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
2 "s
	 supra notes 92-126 and accompanying text. In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court
admitted that 14111e requirement of a business ptirpose is new to our law of mergers and was a
departure from prior case law." 457 A.2d at 715.
2"3 380 A.2d at 980.
2 " 1
 Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1124.
2sS
2"" See Brudney & Chireistein, supra note 9, at 1371. Brudney & Chirelstein maintain that it
would be impossible to deny that a commercial goal was wholly lacking in any parent -subsidiary
merger. Id.
247 379 A.2d at 1124.
"" See Weiss, sup? note 2, at 657-58.
'"" See, e.g., Tanzer, 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.. 426 A.2d 1333 (Del.
Ch. 1981); The Chancery Court's decision in Weinberger illustrates the ineffectiveness of the business
purpose requirement as a grounds for equitable relief. 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981). The
Chancellor held that Signal's desire to make a favorable cash investment was a proper purpose for
effecting the Signal-UOP merger. 14. at 1350.
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concerned that, in the event of a minority shareholder challenge, their purposes for
effecting the merger might be considered improper by a Delaware court. The Tanzer
court emphasized that while parent companies had a right to look to their own interests in
effecting mergers with subsidiaries, the purposes advanced by the parent company had to
be "bona fide" and not suspect as a "subterfuge, the real purpose of which is to rid itself of
unwanted minority shareholders in the subsidiary."'" In one subsequent merger chal-
lenge, the Chancery Court, in the case of Young v. Valhi, Inc., 29 ' enjoined a parent-
subsidiary merger because it found that the "basic purpose" of the merger was to
eliminate the subsidiary's minority shareholders, 292 Because the lower courts were left to
decide what constituted a "laona fide" purpose for effecting a merger on a case by case
basis, a great deal of uncertainty surrounded the business purpose doctrine in the years
following Singer and Tanzer. 253
In addition to the doctrinal confusion created by the Singer business purpose re-
quirement, many commentators criticized the business purpose requirement as being
unrelated to the goals of minority shareholder protection.'" The basis for this view was
that Delaware's long-form merger statute technically allows freezeout mergers, regardless
of the business reasons for the merger, through its majority vote provision. 295 In Dela-
ware, therefore, absent a showing of fraud or other gross misconduct, it was not reason-
able to allow a minority shareholder to block a parent-subsidiary merger, even if the sole
purpose of the merger was to eliminate the minority shareholders from further equity
participation in the company. Nevertheless, the minority shareholders do have a right to
expect fair treatment from the parent company. Minority shareholders have a right to
expect that their interests will be adequately represented in the merger negotiations and
that they will be paid a fair price for their forced departure from the enterprise.
Requiring a showing of a proper business purpose for effecting a merger did nothing to
guarantee that minority shareholders who were frozen out of a corporation were treated
fairly by the majority shareholder.
The Weinberger court's abandonment of the Singer business purpose requirement rep-
resents an improvement in the law governing freezeout mergers in Delaware. The elimi-
nation of the business purpose doctrine clarifies Delaware merger law by eliminating the
doctrinal confusion created by the conflicting and seemingly arbitrary distinctions drawn
by the lower courts between valid and invalid business purposes. 296 Although the lower
299 379 A.2d at 1124.
291 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978),
2" Id. at 1378. For a discussion of Young, see supra note 184.
293 See Weiss, supra note 2, at 668-70.
2" See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 2, at 670-71; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 1356.
Brudney & Chirelstein's main criticism of the Singer business purpose test was that it failed to take
into account the different contexts in which freezeout mergers can arise. Id. Brudney Sc Chirelstein
divided freezeout mergers into three categories: 1) two-step mergers 2) mergers of long held
affiliates and 3) pure going private transactions. Id. This division was based on similar analysis
undertaken by Greene. See Greene, supra note 7, at 491-96. Brudney & Chirelstein argue that
different fairness criteria are appropriate to each category. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 9, at
1356. They propose that because two-step mergers are essentially the same as arm's-length acquisi-
tions by third parties they could be effectively overseen by impossing disclosure requirements on the
acquiring company. Id. at 1359. Brudney & Chirelstein argue that going private mergers do not
achieve economic gains and should be prohibited completely. Id. They believe parent-subsidiary
mergers, however, do advance macro-economic efficiencies, and should be allowed, subject to review
for fairness of price to protect minority shareholders from mistreatment. Id.
295 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 251 (1983).
2 " See Weiss, supra note 2, at 670.
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courts were mandated by the Tanzer decision to review the purposes offered by a parent
company in order to determine whether the purposes were "bona fide," 297
 the lower
courts rarely found a parent company's reasons for effecting a merger to be improper. 2"
The practical effect. of the business purpose doctrine as applied to parent-subsidiary
freezeout mergers, therefore, was that it did not provide minority shareholders any
significant protection. Furthermore, when the Delaware courts were examining the busi-
ness purposes behind a challenged merger, their focus was not directed at the issue that
most concerns minority shareholders: the fairness of the merger price. 205 Perhaps the
most important consequence of the Weinberger court's decision to overrule the Singer
business purpose requirement is that the treatment received by minority shareholders is
now the sole subject of review in freezeout merger challenges. The Weinberger court's
decision to overrule the Singer business purpose test and to establish the Sterling entire
fairness standard as the sole standard of review for freezeout merger challenges better
guarantees that majority shareholders will recieve fair treatment in the future.
B. Entire Fairness
The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger reaffirmed the entire fairness prong of
the two pronged standard of review announced in Singer."" The concept of entire
fairness originated in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp. when the Delaware Supreme Court
determined that the parent company, because it stood on both sides of the transaction,
had to establish the entire fairness of the merger terms to the subsidiary's minority
shareholders. 3" In Singer, the court held that even if a parent company was successful in
establishing that the merger had been effected for a proper purpose, the parent company
still had to prove the entire fairness of the transaction."' The Singer court, however, did
not explain what the concept of entire fairness required, nor did it explain under what
circumstances it would be invoked. 3 " 3
The Weinberger court improved the Sterling entire fairness standard by explaining
when it would be invoked and how it could be satisfied. The Weinberger court explained
that every law suit challenging the fairness of a freezeout merger would not be reviewed
under the entire fairness test. 314 According to the court, minority shareholders challeng-
ing a merger would have to allege "specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other
items of misconduct" in order to challenge a merger under the entire fairness stan-
dard. 3115 The Weinberger court further improved the entire fairness test by articulating
some specific guidelines regarding what would be necessary in order for a freezeout
merger to be considered "entirely fair." 3 "
n See 379 A.2d at 1124.
2y" See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981). The Chancery Court's
decision in Weinberger is an excellent example of the court's reluctance to enjoin a merger on
improper purpose grounds.
2" See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. The Weinberger court noted that in a non-fraudulent
transaction, price is often the "preponderant consideration." Id.
3"" 457 A.2d at 710-11.
311 33 Del. Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 110.
3" 380 A.2d at 980.
343
	 supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
1 " See 457 A.2d at 703.
any
"6 Id. at 709 n.7.
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1. Fair Dealing
The Weinberger court stated that the concept of entire fairness was comprised of two
"basic aspects," fair dealing and fair price. 3" The court stressed, however, that the
concept of entire fairness required that all the elements of a transaction he considered as a
whole in determining whether a parent company had sustained its burden of proof. 31 ' 9
Under the first aspect, the Weinberger court clearly articulated the factors necessary to
demonstrate lair dealing in a parent-subsidiary merger. 359
 The court stated that once the
entire fairness standard had been invoked by a subsidiary's minority shareholders, the
parent company had to establish that the manner in which the transaction was timed,
initialed, structured, negotiated and disclosed was "entirely fair" to the subsidiary's
minority shareholders. 3 '''
The Weinberger court drew upon the laws of directors' fiduciary obligations as the
conceptual foundation for the fair dealing component of the entire fairness test. 3 " Citing
prior Delaware case law, the court reaffirmed the general duties and obligations of
corporate officers acting in dual capacities as directors of two corporations. 312
 Prior
Delaware case law had clearly established the requirement that when directors of a
Delaware corporation stand on both sides of a transaction, they owe the same duty of
good management to both corporal ions. 31 3
 In order to discharge this duty in the context
of a parent-subsidiary merger, the Weinberger court announced that dual directors would
have to prove that all the elements of the transaction, when considered as a whole, were
structured in the best .
 interests of both companies. 3 "
The appropriate discharge of this duty of good management in the context of a
parent-subsidiary merger would be difficult to achieve in practice given the inherent
conflicts of interest that face dual directors. In addition to the difficulties involved in
discharging the duty of good management in practice, it would he even more difficult for
dual directors to establish that this duty has been discharged in court. The entire fairness
standard necessarily requires that courts apply subjective judgment to the facts of a
particular case. Because different courts sometimes reach different conclusions based on
the same facts3 " and because the duty of good management in parent-susidiary dealings
3 " 7
 Id. at 711.
31115 Id.
a" See id.
3111 Id.
3" Id. at 710-11. The court cited Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 156, 221 A.2d 487, 492
(Del. 1939) (individuals acting in a dual capacity owe the same duty of good management to both
corporations); Gottlieb v. Heyde') Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 91 A.2d 57: 57-58 (Del. 1952)
(directors standing on both sides of a transaction are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith
and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5
A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.").
112 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11. See supra note 311.
313 See Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 156, 221 A.2d 487, 492 (Del. 1966).
3 " See 457 A.2d at 710-11.
3" The proceedings in Weinberger are illustrative of this fact. For example, the Chancellor did
not object to the fact that UOP's directors had not pressed Signal for a higher merger price.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1353-54 (Del. Ch. 1981). The Chancellor concluded that
UOP's directors could properly accept Signal's original proposal if they considered the offer to be
fair. Id. at 1354. The Delaware Supreme Court felt quite differently about UOP's failure to negotiate
on behalf of the minority shareholders. The court stated that these negotiations were "modest at
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is a particularly difficult one 10 discharge, the Weinberger court sought to provide man-
agement with an objective mechanism for establishing the fairness of a parent-subsidiary
merger.
The Weinberger court went beyond recapitulating the laws of fiduciary duty by
suggesting specific procedures for the discharge of the fiduciary obligations owed by dual
directors in the context of a parent-subsidiary merger, I ' The court strongly urged that,
in the future, independent negotiating committees composed of subsidiaries' outside
directors be appointed to deal will parent companies at arm's-length. 317 The Weinberger
court stated that "in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was as
though each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the
other at arm's-length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.
-3 "
In addition, court stated that a bargaining arrangement involving the total abstention of
the interested directors of the subsidiary would achieve the same result. 31 " According to
the court, absent these suggested bargaining structures, dual directors would be left to
discharge their fiduciary duties "in light of' what is best for both corporations." 32 ° A
failure to follow the court's suggested guidelines would leave parent companies with the
difficult task of proving to the satisfaction of a court that the elements of the transaction
were structured in the best interests of lxith companies.
By advocating an arm's-length bargaining structure, the Weinberger court entrusted
much of the responsibility for striking a lair deal with the subsidiary's independent
directors. 3" While the Weinberger court stated that it would treat such a bargaining
structure as strong evidence of fairness, 322
 the opportunity nonetheless exists for substan-
tial abuse of this process, 323
 Past experience has demonstrated that independent directors
have not always vigorously pursued the interests of minority shareholders in negotiations
with a parent. company.32 ' Directors of controlled subsidiaries often are prone to viewing
themselves as serving at the pleasure of the parent company. 325 The actions of UOP's
independent directors in the Signal- UOP negotiations evidence this proposition. UOP's
independent directors apparently made no effort to press Signal for a price higher than
$21 per share, 32 " The UOP directors merely acquiesced to the original price range of
best" and "hardly :trm's length negotiations." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. While the Chancellor
concluded that tile terms of the Signal- U01 1
 merger were legally fair, the Delaware Supreme Court.
reversed, stating that the transaciton did not "satisfy any reasonable concept of fair dealing." Id, at
712.
See 457 A.2d at 709 n.7.
317 Id .
31 g
319
 M. at 710-11.
370
.121 See id. at 709 n.7. Commentators have expressed serious reservations about this reliance on
the independent director. See, e.g., Brudney, The Independent Director — Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 96 HARV. L. REV. 597, 638 - 39 (1982); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers
and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 298 (1974).
322
	 A.2d at 709 n.7.
323
 See Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO
L. REV. 245, 255 (1983).
324
 See Brudney, supra note 321, at 617.
32s
	 id. at 610-11,
326 457 A.2d at 711.
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S20-$2I per share suggested by Signal and then insisted on a price of $21 per share."'
Even if LiOP's independent directors believed that $21 per share was a fair price, they
should have attempted to negotiate a higher price for the minority's stock in order to
fulfill their fiduciary obligations to the minority shareholders. 3 = 8 The irony of this particu-
lar case is that if the U01) directors had pressed for a higher price, Signal in all likelihood
would have agreed because the report prepared as part. of the acquisition investigation
indicated that it would have been a good investment for Signal to purchase LIOr's
remaining publicly held shares at any price up to 324 per share, 325 It seems unlikely that
an "independent negotiating committee" of 1)01)'s independent directors would have
pressed Signal for a higher price when the group, as a whole, failed to take any action in
this direction. Consequently, although the Weinberger court sought to achieve fair dealing
in freezeout mergers by establishing a committee of the controlled subsidiary's indepen-
dent directors, the court's failure to recognize adequately the relationship of such direc-
tors to the parent corporation limits the ability of such measures to protect minority
shareholder interests.
The Weinberger decision did, however, establish other devices in order to protect
minority shareholders from the inequitable treatment that may occur at the hands of
docile independent directors. The court, in effect, adopted a totality of the circumstances
approach for examining the dealings between a parent company and its subsidiary in a
f reezeout merger. According to the court, while an independent negotiating structure
may he strong evidence of fairness, it is only one part of the fair dealing component of the
entire fairness test.33" The court stated that once the plaintiff challenging the merger
alleges specific instances of misconduct, thus invoking the entire fairness standard, the
defendant corporations must prove that the transaction, when considered as a whole, was
entirely fair to the subsidiary's minority shareholders, 33 ' After Weinberger, it is clear that
in order to satisfy this burden, a parent corporation will have to establish, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the timing, initiation, structure, negotiation and disclosure
of the transaction were fair to the minority shareholders. 332 To make the arm's-length
bargaining structure it suggested more meaningful and to improve the overall quality of
minority shareholder protection, the Weinberger court emphasized the quality of the
disclosure of infOrmation from parent company to subsidiary. 313
The Weinberger court articulated strict disclosure requirements to ensure informed
decision making by independent directors and minority shareholders in parent-
subsidiary dealings."' The court stated that the lower courts are required to measure
disclosure in terms of "what the defendants had and to measure it against what they gave
to the minority,"33 ' According to the court, nothing less than "complete candor" is
3" Id. The merger price also happened to be the same as the 1975 tender Offer price. Id. at 704.
32 See 457 A.2d at 711. The Weinberger court did not rule specifically that UOP's directors had a
duty to negotiate a higher merger price with Signal. See id. The court took note of the absence of
negotiations as one factor in its decision that the Signal-UOP merger did not satisfy any reasonable
concept of fair dealing. N. at 712.
" 9 Id. at 705.
330 id.
"' Id. at 703.
332 See id. at 711.
333 id. at 711-12.
331 Id. at 710,
33s
	
A.2d at 710 (citing Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp„ 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977)).
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required of the parent company,"" This complete disclosure requirement is of real
practical significance to the independent director and the minority shareholder. A sub-
sidiary's independent directors will have greater bargaining leverage if they are negotiat-
ing with knowledge of all the information relevant to the transaction. For example, if
UOP's independent directors had known that. Signal was prepared to pay up to $24 per
share for UOP's minority interest., U0 P's directors would have been in a position to
bargain for a price higher than the $21 per share to which they actually acquiesced."'
Complete disclosure is of practical importance to minority shareholders as well. The
complete disclosure requirement supplements the minority shareholder protection
achieved by the entire fairness standard, In theory, complete disclosure will, in some
instances, provide minority shareholders with the information necessary to make allega-
tions of misconduct in order to invoke the entire fairness standard. In situations where no
misconduct is apparent, complete disclosure will enable minority shareholders to evaluate
the fairness of the merger price for themselves in deciding whether to accept the offered
consideration or seek an appraisal.
2. Fair Price
As discussed above, the Weinberger court improved the quality of minority share-
holder protection by explaining the fair dealing element of the entire fairness test and by
reaffirming strict disclosure requirements for parent companies in the context of freeze-
out mergers. In addition to these improvements, the court emphasized that the concept of
entire fairness also embraces notions of fair price. 33" The fair price prong of the entire
fairness test serves as additional protection for minority shareholders in situations where
the fair dealing requirements have been largely satisfied. As a component of the entire
fairness test, fair price considerations are only relevant as part of the examination of the
total circumstances of a merger after plaintiff has first made the allegations of misconduct
necessary to invoke the entire fairness test!'" When the plaintiff is disputing only the
merger price, the Weinberger court held that the plaintiff's sole remedy is statutory
appraisal."'" The court recognized that the merger price in a nonfraudulent transaction is
probably "the preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the merger." 3''
For the purposes of determining fair price under the entire fairness standard and in
order to insure that minority shareholders receive fair value for their shares in an
appraisal proceeding, the Weinberger court held that modern valuation techniques could
now be used to establish the value of a minority shareholder's stock. 342
By allowing the use of modern valuation techniques, the court granted minority
shareholders greater latitude in proving the fair value of their stock. Prior to Weinberger,
the "Delaware block" weighted average approach was the only valuation method allowed
to be used by Delaware courts in stock valuation proceedings. 343 The Delaware block
33' See 457 A.2d at 710.
337 See id. at 705, 711.
33$ Id. at 711.
339 See id. 703. The court stated that to invoke the entire fairness obligation, a plaintiff would be
required to allege "specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation or other items of misconduct to demon-
strate the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority." Id.
" 4 " Id. at 715.
Id. at 711.
312
 Irl, at 712-13.
3 ' 13 See in re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 496-500, 52 A.2d 6, 1 ,1-15 (Del.
Ch. 1947). See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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valuation method was a weighed average of asset value, market price and earnings per
share. 344 in Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court abandoned the exclusive use of the
Delaware block method, authorizing the use of contemporary financial market techniques
in the resolution of future valuation disputes. 3 " In support of this holding, the Weinberger
court relied heavily on the language of the Delaware appraisal statute, section 262. 3"
Section 262 instructs courts to "take into account all relevant factors" in valuing a
dissenting shareholder's stock. 3" According to the court, the factors to he considered in
determining fair price include: "assets, market value, earning, future prospects and any
other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock." 3 " Among
these factors, the Weinberger court emphasized that special consideration should be given
to a corporation's "future prospects" in the stock valuation, 349 After identifying the
factors to be considered by courts in determining whether the price given to minority
shareholders in a freezeout merger was fair, however, the Weinberger court did not
articulate any workable test for how these factors could be combined into an overall
determination of the fairness of the merger price. Instead, the court merely held that
courts are required to take "all the relevant factors" into account in determining a
shareholder's proportionate interest in a going concern. 35 "
IV. STRUCTURING FREEZEOUT MERGERS AFTER Weinberger
After Weinberger, corporations will be able to structure parent-subsidiary mergers
that should, in most instances, be immune from challenges by minority shareholders."'
The Weinberger court took decisive steps toward insulating freezeout mergers from
judicial attack by minority shareholders. First, the court clearly articulated procedural
guidelines that, if followed will he considered strong evidence of fair dealing. 352 Second,
3" See In re General Realty & Utilities Corp,, 29 Del. Ch. 480, 496-500, 52 A.2d 6, 14-15 (Del.
Ch. 1947).
345 457 A.2d at 712. The court stated: "To the extent [the Delaware block approach] excludes
other generally accepted techniques used in the financial community and the courts, it is now clearly
outmoded, it is time we recognize this in appraisal and other stock valuation proceedings and bring
our law current on the subject." Id. For an elaborate criticism of the "Delaware block" approach see
generally Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weighting Asset Value and Earnings Value in the Appraisal of Corporate
Stock, 55 S. CAL. I,. REV. 1031 (1982) (the weighted average method systematically tends to under-
value corporate shares).
3" 457 A.2d at 7.13 (citing DEL. ConE ANN. lit. 8, § 262 (1983)).
347 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983).
3" 457 A.2d at 713-14.
3 '" Id. at 713. The court was careful to note that section 262 did not mandate a different
conclusion. See id. The court gave a very narrow reading to the language of the section which
excludes from consideration elements of value that may arise from the "accomplishment or expecta-
tion" of the merger. Id. The court interpreted this language to mean that only the use of pro forma
and speculative projections must be excluded from the valuation determination. Id. The court
continued by stating that lellements of future value, including the nature of the enterprise, which
are known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of speculation,
may be considered." Id. The court believed that anything less would not be giving full effect to the
legislative directive that "all relevant factors" be considered. Id.
35o
	
id. at 713. The court did not express approval for any specific valuation technique, see id.,
apparently preferring to rely on the adversary system to produce the best evidence of fair value.
35' See id. at 709 n.7.
352 See id. This type of negotiating structure was becoming more popular with management
even prior to the Weinberger decision. See Chazenfairness From a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions
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the opinion limited minority shareholders' financial remedy to appraisa1.353 The Wein-
berger court also established the appropriate allocation of the burden of proof in freezout
merger challenges. 334 Weinberger makes clear that in order for minority shareholders to
seek equitable relief under the entire fairness test, they must allege specific acts of fraud,
misrepresentation or other items of misconduct. 355 Once the entire fairness standard has
been invoked, the burden of proof rests with the parent company to establish the entire
fairness of the merger.356 Liability is established if the parent company is unable to meet
this burden of proof; it is then left to the court's discretion to order any form of equitable
or monetary relief required by the cireumstances. 3" If minority shareholders are unable
to make specific allegations of fraud or other misconduct, the entire fairness test is not
invoked and the minority shareholders' only recourse is to seek an appraisal of their
shares as provided for by statute. 356
In discussing the allocation of the burden of proof, the Weinberger court provided
parent companies with a mechanism for shifting the burden of proof back to the minority
shareholders after the entire fairness test has been invoked. 355 In order to shift the
burden of proof, the parent company could condition the consummation of the merger
on the approval of a majority of the subsidiary's minority shareholders. 3 " The court
stressed, however, that the minority shareholder vote must he an "informed" one."' In
order to prove that the vote was informed, the Weinberger court ruled that the parent
company had to prove that it had disclosed all the material facts relevant to the transac-
tion." 2 If the parent company is unable to demonstrate that it disclosed all the material
facts necessary for a court to consider the vote informed, the Weinberger court stated that
the burden of proof would then remain the parent company's. 36" If the plaintiffs alleged
specific acts of misconduct and the parent company demonstrated that a majority of the
subsidiary's minority shareholders had approved the merger in an informed vote, the
Weinberger court ruled that the burden of proof would then be on the plaintiff's challeng-
ing the merger to prove the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority sharehold-
ers. 361 Consequently, if parent companies wished to place the burden of proof on the
minority shareholders in subsequent litigation, they could condition the merger on the
informed approval of a majority of the subsidiary's minority shareholders,
If a parent did not want to condition a freezeout merger on a minority shareholder
vote, it could take advantage of the independent negotiating structure suggested by the
Weinberger court.365 The court advocated the use of an independent negotiating commit-
tee composed of a subsidiary's outside directors to deal at arm's-length with the parent
of Public Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. L'w. 1439, 1440-41
(1981).
"3 457 A.2d at 715.
"4
 Id. at 703.
"5 See id.
356 Id.
"4 Id, at 714.
"" Id. at 714-15.
3s9 Id. at 703.
"° Id.
381.
3"' Id.
"' Id.
"' Id.
3" See id. at 709 n.7.
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company in negotiating the terms of the merger. 36 " The court stated that the use of such a
bargaining structure would be "strung evidence" of Citirness," 7 In addition, the Weinberger
court stated that a showing that (he subsidiary's interested directors totally abstained
from any participation in the transaction would also be highly probative of the fairness of
the deal's"" Accordingly, it seems unlikely that parent companies will he willing to
structure 1i-eczema mergers in the future without conditioning the merger on minority
shareholder approval or employing one of the procedural safeguards suggested by the
Weinberger court. Once the entire fairness test has been invoked, the parent company
must establish the entire fairness of the merger and that it fulfilled its duty of good
management to both companies in structuring the deal.""" Without making use of these
additional protections, parent companies will have a more difficult time meeting this
burden or proof, incurring a greater risk that the merger will be set aside.
One potential drawback to the Delaware Supreme Cour't's decision in Weinberger is
that t he emphasis the opinion places on compliance with procedural guidelines may cause
lower courts to place form over substance in considering challenges to freezeout mergers.
Delaware courts should should be alert for situations where the parent company has
formally complied with the procedural guidelines set out in Weinberger, but has, in fact,
subjected t he subsidiary's minority shareholders to substantial unfairness.'" By relying
on a self-governed artificial arm's-length bargaining structure, the Weinberger court en-
trusted the subsidiary's independent directors with the responsibility of fairly represent-
ing t he interests of the minority shareholders. 3 " Sonic judicial checks are necessary to
guarantee that the actual substance of the parent-subsidiary negotiations truly approxi-
mate arm's-length bargaining.
V. A RECOMMENDED iNF:COTIATING STRUCTURE FOR PARENT-SUBSIDIARY FREEZEOUT
MERGERS
In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that in Future merger transactions
evidence of negotiations between representatives of the parent company and a committee
of its subsidiary's independent directors would be highly indicative of fairness in any
subsequent court challenge. 372 While the court, by stating that such a transaction would he
presumptively fair, provided management with strong incentive to use such a negotiating
st tincture, it failed to explore the ramifications of this independent negotiating concept . "'
For example, the Weinberger court did not provide any guidelines as to how the members
of the subsidiary's independent negotiating committee should be selected. instead, the
court merely stated in general terms that the committee should be composed of the
subsidiary's independent directors. 374 As noted earlier, behind a facade of arm's-length
bargaining, a parent company could dominate merger negotiations by _appointing only
partisan or indifferent independent directors to the subsidiary's negotiating team. 3 ' 5 el'he
366 Id .
3H1
3" hi. at 710-11.
309 id ,
"" See Weiss, supra note 323, at 255.
?' See infra notes 372 - 91 and accompanying text.
157 A,2(1 at 709 1 -1.7.
373 See id.
"T1 a
373 See supra note 321.
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Weinberger court should have instructed the lower courts to examine the selection process
behind the subsidiary's negotiating committee to make sure that it was free from the
parent company's influence before treating the use of such a bargaining structure as
strong evidence of fairness. A transaction, therefore, should only be considered presump-
tively fair in situations where the subsidiary's negotiating committee is truly independent.
A second area in which the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger should have taken
further steps to protect the interests of minority shareholders is in the determination of a
fair price for their stock. Although it is generally recognized that there is no one correct
stock valuation method, 37 " the Weinberger court could have improved the substance of the
arm's-length bargaining structure it suggested by articulating specific negotiating guide-
lines to be used by the parties in negotiating the price for the minority's stock. Specifically,
the independent bargaining structure could provide more effectively for fair treatment of
minority shareholders in freezeout merger transactions if the negotiated merger price
were required to fall within a specified range. Such a price range is necessary for the
protection of minority shareholders because even if the subsidiary's independent direc-
tors negotiate the merger price, the final figure is likely to be as low as reasonable
pessimism will allow. 377
 Commentators have found that a subsidiary's independent direc-
tors often view themselves as serving at the pleasure of the parent company. 378 As a result
of this perception, total reliance upon independent directors to represent the minority
shareholders' interests in merger negotiations with the parent company is misplaced. The
Weinberger court, therefore, should have articulated general price guidelines to serve as
ceiling and floor benchmarks for future merger negotiations involving an independent
negotiating structure.
Specific ceiling and floor figures would provide courts, management and minority
shareholders alike with useful guidelines of fairness. Even though, as noted earlier, there
is no one generally accepted stock valuation method for determining the proper price
for the minority's shares, 379
 there has been some agreement among the commentators
concerning the valuation formulas of ceiling and floor values of corporate stock. 3" In
parent-subsidiary mergers, two valuation methods in particular have been suggested to
determine the approximate ceiling and floor values of the subsidiary's stock. At the lower
end of the spectrum is the market value of the acquired company's stock. 3 " The merger
price in a parent-subsidiary merger should never fall below the prevailing market price
for the subsidiary's stock, because the minority shareholders should not be forced to
accept a price lower than what they could have received if they had sold their stock in the
market prior to the merger.'" The ceiling figure of the recommended price range would
be the amount per share that could he realized if the entire company was sold to a third
party in an arm's-length transaction. 3" This third party sale value ceiling figure could be
3" See Banks, Measuring the Value of Corporate Stock, 11 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 1 (1974).
a " See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 321, at 298.
3" See Brudney, supra note 321, at 610-11: Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 321, at 298.
a7'4 See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
3" See Banks, supra note 376, at 1.
3" See Brudney	 Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 1372-73.
2" See id.
2" See Chazen, supra note 352, at 1440; Weiss, supra note 2, at 678-80. Weiss argues that a
parent company should be required to pay at least as much for the minority interest in a subsidiary as
the minority shareholders could realize if' the subsidiary was sold to a third party in an arm's-length
transaction. Id.
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approximated by analyzing other similar accquisitions or mergers. 384 The representatives
of the parent company and its subsidiary should be expected to negotiate the actual
merger price within this range of values. Representatives of the subsidiary should press
for a premium in excess of the current market price, because it has become customary for
t he stockholders of a target company to receive a premium above the market price.a"s
The representatives of the parent company will be unwillit tg to pay it premium equal to
the ceiling price, however, because the subsidiary's publicly held shares will be worth less
to the parent company than they would be to a third party. 3 " The subsidiary's publicly
held shares are worth less to the parent company because it already owns a controlling
interest in the subsidiary. A third party seeking to purchase the entire company would
have to pay a higher premium per share because it would be purchasing both the control
block owned by the parent company and the minority interest. Because the patent
company will, therefore, be unwilling to pay third party sale value for the minority's
shares, the subsidiary's negotiating representives may properly accept a premium lower
than third party sale value. 3 ' 7
Imposing a lower limit on the price given to minority shareholders in a parent-
subsidiary merger would, in effect, set a minimum fair price standard. The parent
company should he required to pay the subsidiary's minority shareholders at least enough
money, or other valuable consideration, to enable them to reacquire the same propor-
tionate interest in the parent company that they would have possessed had the merger
been a straight stock for stock transaction. 388 A direct effect of establishing a minimum
floor requirement would be that merger prices Wing below this figure would be consid-
ered presumptively unfair. A court examining a parent-subsidiary merger under the
entire fairness test should consider such a merger price to be highly probative of the
unfairness of the entire. transaction.
The above suggested price guidelines could be used in courtrooms as well as at
bargaining tables. As the starting point in all merger negotiations, both parties would be
In Weinberger, the plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence to establish a third party sale value
price figure for UOP's stock by offering a comparative analysis of the premiums paid over market in
ten other comparable tender offer merger combinations. 457 A.2d at 712.
3" See Chazen, supra note 352 at 1440.
3"5
	 id. at 1445.
3" Id. at 1471.
3 " 7 See id. at 1447. Chazen believes before an arm's length standard of fairness should be
accepted, the parent company should be required to demonstrate that the merger price was within
- the range.that would have resulted from an arm's length transaction." Id. Chazen argues that there
is is range of Fairness based on the range of prices a shareholder might obtain if proposals to buy the
company were sought from other potential purchasers. Id. at 1439.
"' Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 1372-73. Brudney & Chirelstein would go further
than this minimum requirement, however. They advocate that the minority shareholders should
receive a share of the synergistic gains generated by the merger. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra
note 321, at 323. This approach was adopted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Mills v.
Electric Auto - Lite Co., 552 F.2c1 1239, 1248-49 (2d Cir. 1977). Brudney & Chirelstein distinguish
between cases where the parent company is closely held as a result of the merger and cases where the
parent company remains a public company. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 1374. If the
parent company is closely held after the merger, Brudney & Chirelstein contend that a merger may
be unfair per se, because there is no means for minority shareholders to reacquire an equity interest
in the parent corporation. Id. They pointed out that in situations where the parent company is closely
held as a result of the merger, there may be no way to determine whether the merger price was fair.
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expected to develop their own ceiling and floor price figures. In a subsequent court
challenge to the price given to the minority shareholders under the entire fairness
standard, the court should require a showing that each party actually developed these
price figures and used them in the actual bargaining. In the absence of such a showing,
the court should not accept evidence of an independent. negotiating structure as strong
evidence of the fairness of the entire transaction. By requiring that these price guidelines
be followed in all mergers, courts would be able to check for possible abuses of the
Weinberger independent negotiating structure by parent companies.
Established ceiling and floor price guidelines would also be beneficial in situations
where independent negotiating structure were not used by t he parties in accomplishing a
merger. In the future, parent companies could be required to disclose these price
guidelines to the subsidiary's directors and minority shareholders. The disclosure of these
standards would be useful to the minority shareholders in assessing whether to approve
the merger terms or dissent and seek an appraisal.'" If a shareholder decided to
challenge such a merger, the court could attempt to simulate arm's-length bargaining
within this range in t he context of an adversarial proceeding.'"
CONCLUSION
The Weinberger decision clarifies and improves Delaware's treatment of parent-
subsidiary freezeout mergers. Since 1977, Delaware courts had been examining freezeout
mergers under the business purpose requirement announced in Singer a. Magnavox Co..
By overruling the Singer business purpose test, the Weinberger court. improved minority
shareholder treatment and facilitated the structuring of future freezeout mergers. Dela-
ware courts now can focus on the merger transaction itself to determine whether the
minority shareholders were treated fairly. Although minority shareholders will be rele-
gated to the appraisal remedy when the only issue in dispute is the adequacy of the
merger price, the Weinberger court improved the appraisal remedy by authorizing the use
of modern valuation techniques in appraisal proceedings in order to ensure that minority
shareholders receive fair value for their stock. Weinberger also recognized the need for
appropriate equitable relief' in situations where appraisal was riot adequate, but not in
circumstances as broad arid ill-defined as those contemplated by the Singer court when it
announced the business purpose requirement. In circumstances where the minority
shareholders make specific allegations of instances of misconduct such as fraud or over-
reaching, the Weinberger court ruled that the parent company would then be required to
prove the entire fairness of the transaction. In instances where the parent company could
not meet this burden, the Weinberger court stated that the Chancellor's powers were
complete to fashion any appropriate form of equitable or monetary relief.
To assist parent corporations in meeting the burdens imposed by the entire fairness
standard, the Weinberger court articulated guidelines. The court recommended the use of
an independent negotiating structure, which when used would be considered by the
courts as strong evidence of fairness. One weakness with the court's decision is the
5" Even if the merger price was presumptively fair, approving the transaction would foreclose a
minority shareholder from seeking an appraisal of his shares. See DEL. Gone ANN. III. 8, § 262(a)
(1983). -
aa' See Chazen, supra note 352. at 1446. Chazen believes that judicial review of freezeout
mergers could be viewed as a substitute for amt's length bargaining on behalf of the public minority
shareholders. M.
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potential for manipulation of this negotiating structure. The Weinberger court could have
improved the negotiating structure it suggested by defining specific ceiling and floor price
guidelines to he used in the bargaining process. The use of such guidelines would help
ensure that the negotiations between parent and subsidiary result in a fair merger price.
GEOFFREY E. HOBART
